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INTRODUCTION * * *

A strong and vital United States Banking system is essential to
the economic well being of this nation and, indeed, the economic
*** [Editor's Note] For earlier discussions of the issues raised by the
White Paper, see Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: Hearings on
the Expansion of Commercial Banks' Securities Business Operations and the
Elimination of Barriers Between the Banking and Securities Industries
Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975); E. HERMVIAN, CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST: COMMERCIAL BANK TRUST DEPARTMENTS (1975); R. JENNINGS
& H. MARsr, JR., SECURITIES REGULATION, CASES AND MATERIALS 19-21 (4th
ed. 1977); I L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 121, 174, (2d ed. 1961); II id.

1189-91, 1295-96; V id. 3189-202, 3355-56 (Supp. 1969); PRACTICING LAW IN-

STITUTe, BANKS AND THE SECUrIIES LAWS 1975 (1975); PRACTIcING LAW INSTITUTE, BANKS Am~ TEE SECURITIES LAWS IN 1974 (1974); PRACTICING LAW
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stability of the world. Banks play a central role in international
trade and finance and domestically provide the credit essential to
the smooth flow of commerce. The importance of the role of banks
in this country is underscored by the unique legal and regulatory
INSTITUTE, BANKS AND THE SECURITIES LAWS (1973); D. RATNER, SECURITIES
REGULATION: MATERIALS FOR A BASIC COURSE 5 (1975); J. WHITE, TEACHING

MATERIALS ON BANKING LAW 319-47, 375-82 (1976); Lipton, Commercial
Banks' and Other Lenders' Responsibilities Under the Federal Securities
Law, in EXPANDING RESPONSIBILITIES UNDER THE SECURITIES LAW 257-82 (S.

Goldberg ed. 1973); Beatty, What are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of
National Bank Services? 86 BANKING L.J. 3 (1969); Beatty, The Incidental
Powers of National Banks, 4 NAT'L BANKING REV. 263 (1967); Carter, Bank
Loans and Bank Credit Agreements: Federal Securities Laws Status, 93
BANKING L.J. 1020 (1976); Casey, The SEC and the Bankers, 3 J. Co'm.
BANK LENDING 3 (1972); Chase, The Emerging Financial Conglomerate:
Liberalizationof the Bank Holding Company Act, 60 GEO. L.J. 1225 (1972);
Clark, The Soundness of Financial Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976);
Evans, Regulation of Bank Securities Activities, 91 BANKING L.J. 611
(1974); Garrett, The SEC and its Concern with Bank Trust Activities, 113
TR. & EST. 280 (1974); Golembe, Our Remarkable Banking System, 53 VA.
L. REV. 1091 (1967); Greenberg, Banks and the Federal Securities Laws:
Some Recent Developments, 49 S. CALIF. L. REV. 665 (1976); Hackley, Our
Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REV. (pts. 1 & 2) 565, 771 (1966);
Hackley, Our DiscriminatoryBanking Structure, 55 VA. L. REV. 1421 (1969);
Harfield, Sermon on Genesis 17:20; Exodus 1:10 (A proposal for testing the
propriety of expanding bank services), 85 BANKING L.J. 565 (1968); Herman
& Safanda, The Commercial Bank Trust Department and the "Wall," 14
B.C. INDUs. & COm. L. REV. 21 (1972); Huck, What is the Banking Business?,
21 Bus. LAw. 537 (1966); Israels, Banks and Federal Securities Regulation,
85 BANKING L.J. 1 (1968); Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department
Investment Activities: Seven Gaps, Eight Remedies, 90 BANKING L.J. (pt. 1)
912 (1973); Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Investment
Activities: Seven Gaps; Eight Remedies, 2 SEc. REG. L.J. (pt. 1) 122 (1974);
Lybecker, Regulation of Bank Trust Department Investment Activities, 82
YALE L.J. 977 (1973); Mehle, Bank Underwriting of Municipal Revenue
Bonds: Preserving Free and Fair Competition, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1117
(1975); Miller, Banks and Securities Act of 1933, 84 BANKING L.J. 95 (1967);
Murane, SEC, FTC, and the Federal Bank Regulators: Emerging Problems
of Administrative JurisdictionalOverlap, 61 GEO. L.J. 37 (1972); Peltzman,
Entry in Commercial Banking, 8 J.L. & ECoN. 11 (1965); Perkins, The
Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING
L.J. 483 (1971); Robertson, Federal Regulation of Banking: A Plea for Unification, 31 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 673 (1966); Ryder, The Legal Meaning of
"Bank," 1965 J. Bus. L. 34; Saxon & Miller, Common Trust Funds, 53 GEo.
L.J. 994 (1965); Schotland, Bank Trust Departments and Public Policy
Today, 4 SEC. REG. L.J. 389 (1977); Schweitzer, Banks and Banking-A
Review of a Definition, 94 BANKINa L.J. 6 (1977); Solomon, Institutional
Investors: Stock Market Impact and Corporate Control, 42 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 761 (1974); Willis, The Banking Act of 1933 in Operation, 35 COLUM. L.
REV. 697 (1935); Note, Glass-Steagall Act-A History of its Legislative
Origins and Regulatory Construction, 92 BANKING L.J. 38 (1975) (adapted

framework in which they function. Because of this unique position,
it is no small wonder that "the American people have repeatedly
demonstrated their determination to have a sound system of banking."'
Background

The banking system currently is undergoing its most extensive
governmental review in over forty years. For example, the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Banking, Currency and Housing Committee
recently has completed a broad study of the nation's depository institutions2 and has proposed legislation to reform the regulatory
structure of the banking industry. 3
The Securities Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs also is conducting an extensive
study of bank securities services, including brokerage-related services and investment advisory services. 4 The Subcommittee's study
from a press release of the Honorable James E. Smith, Comptroller of the
Currency); Note, The Glass-Steagall Banking Act of 1933, 47 HARV. L. REV.
325 (1933); Note, Commingled Investment Accounts: Banks v. Securities
Industry, 45 NoTRE DAME LAW. 746 (1970); Note, Bank-Sponsored Investment Services: Statutory Proscriptions, Jurisdictional Conflicts, and a
Legislative Proposal, 27 U. FLA. L. REV. 776 (1975); Note, The Legality of

Bank-Sponsored Investment Services, 84 YALE L.J. 1477 (1975); Comment,

Implementation of the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970:
The Scope of Banking Activities, 71 MicH. L. Rzv. 1170 (1973); Comment,
Banks, Trusts and Investment Companies: The Commingled Investment

Fund, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1276 (1967); Comment, Banks and the Securities

Act of 1933, 52 VA. L. Rsv. 117 (1966); Golembe Associates, Commercial
Banks and Investment Banking 2, 37-49, 56, 59-64, 67-73 (revised, Nov. 29,
1976) (unpublished paper prepared for the Economic & Financial Research
Div. of the Am. Bankers Assoc. on file with the San Diego Law Review) ("in
no sense should this paper be viewed as an analysis of, or response to, the
SIA [Bank SecuritiesActivities] document").
1. Address by Arthur F. Burns, Chairman, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Maintaining the Soundness of Our Banking System 1, given at 1974 American Bankers Association Convention in Honolulu,
Hawaii (Oct. 21, 1974) (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
2. Hearings on FinancialInstitutions and the Nation's Economy (FINE)
Study Discussion Principles Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions
Supervision, Regulation and Insurance of the House Comm. on Banking,
Currency and Housing, 94th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1975-1976).

3. Federal Reserve Reform Act, H.R. 12934; Financial Reform Act of
1976, H.R. 13077, & International Banking Act of 1976, H.R. 13211, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). (The House has passed H.R. 13876 in place of H.R.
13211; further action on the other two bills is not expected).

4. Suco mn. oN SEcunrrjis OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HousING AND URBN AFFAIRs, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., THE SECURITIEs ACTIVITIES
oF COMMERCIAL BANKs, STUDY OUTLINE (Comm. Print 1975).
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will attempt to determine, among other things, whether allowing
banks to provide securities services may cause an undue concentration of economic power and whether it may endanger the safety
and solvency of banks or investor confidence in capital markets.0
In addition to legislative review, the Capital Markets Task Force,
an interagency working group which the Department of the Treasury chairs, is conducting a far-ranging study of bank securities services, including brokerage-related, investment advisory and investment banking services, to determine if the availability of securities
services from banks might have an adverse effect on the nation's
capital markets.0

In 1974, the Securities and Exchange Commission

(SEC) conducted an extensive inquiry into bank securities services
to determine if adequate protection is being afforded investors patronizing those services. 7 The SEC is now undertaking a congressionally mandated study to determine whether it is appropriate to
continue to exempt banks from many of the provisions of the securities laws. 8 In addition to the adequacy of investor protection, the
SEC has also expressed concern about the disparity of regulatory
burdens among participants in the securities industry as a matter
of competitive fairness."
This extensive governmental consideration of the appropriateness
of bank-sponsored securities services has initiated a widespread
public debate. We believe it is essential that those who will play
a role in resolving this issue be aware of the securities industry's
point of view. This paper is intended to present the industry's perspective in a manner that will contribute to intelligent and informed debate.
5. Unfortunately, the study does not intend to examine the serious problems raised by investment banking services provided by banks.
6. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, PUBLIC POLICY ASPECTS OF BANK SECURITIES
ACTIVITIES-AN ISSUES PAPER (Nov. 1975) [hereinafter cited as TREASURY
ISSUES PAPER].

SEC, COMMISSION INQUIRY CONCERNING BANE-SPONSORED INVESTMENT
Securities Act of 1933, Release No. 5491, Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Release No. 10761, Investment Company Act of 1940, Release No.
8336 & Investment Advisers Act of 1940, Release No. 409 (Apr. 30, 1974).
8. SEC, Study of Persons Excluded from Definition of "Broker" and
"Dealer" Pursuant to the Directive of section 1A (e) of Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, as amended.
9. E.g., Securities Activities of Commercial Banks: Hearings Before the
Securities Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 140-41 (1975) (Testimony of SEC Chairman
Roderick M. Hills).
7.

SERVICES,

Summary
It has long been the public policy of the United States to separate
the business of commercial banking from other areas of commerce. 10
This theme has predominated bank reform legislation from the
Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act) through the 1970
amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act and is visible in
legislation currently pending in Congress.
Their dominant position as the principal suppliers of credit to the
private sector of the economy makes bankers a force to be reckoned
with, with substantial influence not only on the economic and financial community but on our social and political institutions as
well. Indeed, concern over excessive concentrations of power in
the banking industry is manifest in many features of the present
structure of our banking system, which includes a dual system of
state and federal regulation, restrictions on interstate banking and
a separate industry-apart from commercial banking-comprised of
savings and loan and other thrift institutions.
In addition to their efforts to limit concentration, our legislators
consistently have attempted to circumscribe the tendency of banks
to become entrepreneurs rather than intermediaries-that is, investing depositors' funds on their own rather than providing credit
to others. During the 1920's and early 1930's, bank participation
in the securities industry threatened to bring the underwriting of
equity securities and medium- to long-term debt instruments
under the domination of the major commercial banks." Congress
enacted legislation explicitly separating banking from most aspects
of the securities business. More recently in 1970, Congress, in
amending the Bank Holding Company Act, codified the principle
that banking organizations should confine their activities to fields
12
closely related to banking.
In recent years, commercial banks again have begun to expand
their operations into numerous nonbanking businesses. Some busi10. As early as 1864, the National Bank Act limited the power of banks
chartered by the federal government to engage in activities other than traditional banking functions. National Bank Act, Act of June 3, 1864, ch. 106,
13 Stat. 99 (incorporated into 1878 Rev. Stat.).
11. "By the end of the decade [the 1920's] commercial banks and their
affiliates had become the dominant force in the investment banking field."
Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History,
88 B A=rG L.J. 483, 495 (1971). In 1930, commercial banks and their
affiliates underwrote 61% of all new bond issues. Id.
12. Some pertinent excerpts from the legislative history of both the
Glass-Steagall Act and the Bank Holding Company Act, including the 1970
amendments, are set forth in App. I p. 800 infra.
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nesses in which they have engaged, or attempted to engage, include
operating an insurance agency, providing financial and management
consulting services, operating travel agencies, providing armored
car service, leasing automobiles, and providing data processing serv13
ices.
It has been widely assumed that existing banking law prohibits
bank expansion into securities activities, other than those specifically permitted by the Glass-Steagall Act. In the area of underwriting and dealer activity, this assumption generally has not been
questioned, although there remains some uncertainty about the
kinds of government obligations which qualify for the exemption
afforded by the Glass-Steagall Act. The legal status of other investment banking activities, however, is less clear. The Office of
the Deputy Comptroller of the Currency has ruled that banks may
offer private placement services, subject to a number of conditions
-for example, a bank may not participate in negotiations between
the issuer and the purchasers or charge a fee for its services contingent upon the success of the placement. The status of financial
advisory services offered by banks to corporate clients, such as advice on mergers and long-term financing, also is in doubt. The
practice of syndicating long-term bank loans is another area where
the legal implications of Glass-Steagall have yet to be definitively
resolved.
More recently, banks have sought to offer certain types of brokerage services, such as monthly automatic investment plans and dividend reinvestment plans. The legality of the former has been judicially challenged and upheld by a United States district court, a
decision which currently is being appealed. At least one major
commercial bank has reported plans to offer a standard brokerage
service to the general public, and so far no regulatory authority
has moved to challenge this undertaking. It seems fair to conclude
that the status of brokerage-related activities under present law is
highly uncertain.
The courts and, to some extent, the bank regulatory agencies have
sought to place certain restrictions on bank expansionism. But the
issues raised by bank participation in these activities are too important to be resolved in this manner, especially since the process
13. See note 139 infra.

would involve application of legislative proscriptions over forty
years old to facts clearly not then contemplated by Congress. It
is a phenomenon which raises critical public policy issues deserving
of careful reevaluation by Congress. Such a reevaluation requires
examination of the principles and policies underlying the GlassSteagall Act and other major banking legislation to determine the
need for updating their provisions in light of contemporary activities of banks and bank holding companies.
There are a number of important policy considerations which
should be weighed in the course of any congressional review. A
good starting point would be a definition of what Congress now
believes are realistic and necessary goals to be attained by national
policy respecting the banking and securities industries. We believe
that an appropriate list of such goals would be: (a) to promote
maximum efficiency in the capital markets, (b) to create an environment in which financial institutions have both the incentive and
the ability to meet the rapidly changing demands of our economy,
(c) to create a climate in which public trust in intermediating institutions is high, (d) to encourage widespread direct public ownership
of United States industry, (e) to promote fair competition not only
within markets but also between markets for substitute products,
(f) to limit the economic and political power of any one sector, and
(g) to protect investors and depositors against improper practices.
These objectives may conflict at times, and careful reconciliation
often is necessary to strike a reasonable balance. The activities of
banks must be regulated with a view toward promoting these goals.
Because of their importance as financial intermediaries, banks
have been accorded a variety of privileges designed to reduce their
costs of intermediation. The intended effect of reducing these costs
is to make credit available to the economy at low cost. Included
among such privileges are favorable tax treatment, restrictions on
entry into the banking business, and the ability to obtain funds
readily at low cost from depositors, from other banks in the federal
funds market, and from the Federal Reserve's discount window. Because of these and other advantages, banks possess an enormous
edge when they compete with other types of enterprises in nonbanking businesses.
The critical point is that each of these advantages or privileges
is paid for by taxpayers and bank depositors and is provided to
banks for the benefit of those in need of credit. They are not for
the purpose of enhancing the ability of banks to engage in nonbanking activities; in fact, it would constitute a clear departure from
their purpose if banks were permitted to employ them in such ac-
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tivities. Equally as important, it would be highly unfair to expect
nonbanking entities to compete with banks in businesses other than
banking without the benefit of such privileges.
Another concern which cannot be overlooked in any reevaluation
of permissible bank activities is an appraisal of the economic power
which the major commercial banks presently possess and continue
to gather. Commercial banks already are such a significant force
in the economy, and so far overshadow all other intermediary institutions, that any serious study of the nation's present and prospective financial structure cannot ignore their growing influence. Commercial banks control in the aggregate over $1,300 billion in assets
and provide well over half of all external corporate financing
through bank loans.
In this regard, a good deal of public and congressional concern
stems from the fear that banks may become so dominant that, for
practical purposes, no alternative means of financing will remain
available to provide business capital-a situation not unlike that
which currently prevails in Europe, where commercial banks control virtually every source of credit. Failure to take account of
this possibility could have serious consequences not only for our
economy but for our political system as well.
There are several other factors which should receive consideration in the review of banking law here recommended. They include
scrutiny of the conflicts of interest with which bankers are faced
when they provide securities or other nonbanking services, the potential impact on the stability of the banking system of bank expansion into nonbanking activities, and the adequacy of investor protection when banks offer brokerage and other securities services.
It is our belief such a review will prompt Congress to conclude
that reform of the banking laws is required to restrict banks from
continuing on their present course. Such reform should effect a
tightening of the existing provisions of the Glass-Steagall and Bank
Holding Company Acts, which seek to restrict banks to bankingrelated activities. It also should ensure that banks are not permitted to underwrite revenue bonds. Moreover, any amendments
should effect whatever changes are necessary to ensure that bank
regulators will not be tempted to erode such statutory limitations.
Legislative reform of this kind should be accompanied by changes
in the laws applicable to activities carried on in the United States

by banking organizations affiliated with foreign banks. The policy
objective should be to regulate such organizations in a manner comparable to regulation of domestic banks, particularly with respect
to limitations on nonbanking activities.
In the material which follows, we shall undertake to explore in
detail the nature and implications of increasing bank involvement
in other areas and particularly in the securities business. This task
has been rendered considerably more complex by the absence of
reporting requirements and the unavailability, for obvious competitive reasons, of much data relating the specific activities engaged
in by individual banks. We also have experienced some difficulty
in learning the precise nature of the positions with respect to such
activities taken by certain bank regulatory agencies which do not
make public in the normal course replies to requests for interpretive
advice or rulings.
SEcuRITIES AcTIvITIEs OF BANKS

The role played by commercial banks in various aspects of the
securities business has become extensive in recent years, undoubtedly beyond anything dreamed of by Congress when the GlassSteagall Act was adopted. Although lack of comprehensive information makes cataloguing a difficult task, the following subsections
contain a brief description of their principal activities in this area.
Investment Advisory Services
Apart from their own assets, banks are responsible for the management of more funds than is any other type of financial institution. 14 In their capacity as fiduciaries, banks manage the assets
of pension and other employee benefit plans and of trusts and
estates of individuals. In their capacity as agent, they manage the
portfolios of a variety of individual and corporate customers. In
addition, banks serve as investment advisers to both open-end and
closed-end investment companies and also act as investment advisers to Real Estate Investment Trusts (REIT) (which, in many cases,
they sponsor).
Brokerage Related Services
In recent years, many banks have begun to offer their customers
several brokerage related services. One of the more common of
14. The Treasury Department has estimated that commercial banks manage approximately $400 billion in trust assets alone. TREASURY ISSUES
PAPEa, supra note 6, at 7.
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these is the automatic investment service (AIS). Through AIS
plans, banks offer customers the opportunity to have a specified
amount automatically deducted each month from their checking accounts and invested by the banks in the common stock of one or
more issuers included on a list supplied by the bank. The list typically includes the twenty-five largest corporations in the Standard
and Poor's 425 Industrial Index, based on the market value of the
corporation's outstanding common stock. The bank pools the
monthly deductions from the accounts of the participating customers and orders a broker to execute transactions for the pooled accounts. Each AIS customer receives a monthly statement indicating, among other things, the number of shares purchased and the
purchase price.
Some banks also offer dividend reinvestment plans under which
investors may have the dividends they receive from a participating
corporation automatically reinvested in the securities of that corporation. Through these plans, shareholders of a participating corporation may request that their dividends be paid directly to a bank
which pools the dividends received and purchases additional shares
of the corporation's stock in the open market.
Besides pooling funds and acting as a conduit between brokers
and customers, some banks perform a more traditional type of brokerage by executing agency transactions for their trust and other
managed accounts, as well as for banking customers, either through
a registered broker-dealer in the case of exchange transactions or
directly in the over-the-counter market.
More recently, Chemical Bank of New York has announced that
it plans to offer brokerage services to customers on an agency basis,
regardless of whether a banking relationship with the customer exists. 15 The bank will charge a fee to participate in the service and

a flat fee per transaction. A major clearing firm reportedly will
execute these transactions for Chemical. A spokesman for the bank
indicated that its marketing plans were still being developed but
would not deny that the service might be promoted through bank
mailings to checking and savings account customers. 16 The possibil15. The Chemical Bank announced that it would offer brokerage services
and place the orders through registered broker-dealers. SEC. WEEK, Mar.
15, 1976, at 1.
16. Id. Mar. 29, 1976, at 7.

ity that a bank affiliate might apply for stock exchange membership
remains open.
In the over-the-counter market, particularly the "third market"
where listed securities are traded, banks have a long history of dealing directly with market makers as agents for their customers. To
the extent they do so, they appear to be performing a traditional
broker-dealer function.
Investment Banking Services
Banks are permitted to underwrite and distribute publicly debt
instruments which constitute general obligations of United States
government units, although they reputedly purchase more of their
syndicate participation for their own accounts than they distribute.1 7 In recent years, the definition of a general obligation bond
has been broadened by the Comptroller of the Currency so as to
include a number of instruments more traditionally thought of as
revenue bonds. Apart from underwriting, the investment banking
activities of commercial banks generally take two forms-the rendering of financial advice to corporations and the finding or furnishing (or both) of funds for the long-term capital needs of corporations.
Financial counseling may be provided for a fee either on a longterm basis or for specific projects-for example, the financing of
a new plant-and generally comprehends the customer's total need
for financing, ranging from short-term borrowings to permanent
capital.' 8 When funds are to be obtained other than through the
bank itself, the bank frequently will assist its customer in preparing
the necessary documents for a private placement1 9 or in selecting
and negotiating with an underwriter in the case of a public offering.
Banks also furnish financial advice in connection with corporate
reorganizations, including mergers and acquisitions, and sometimes
perform appraisal services in connection with such transactions.
Banks also serve directly as a source of long-term funds, either
through their own lending facilities or by arranging private placements of securities with other lenders. At the time the GlassSteagall Act was enacted, bank lending typically was short term
17. E. HERmAN, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: CommnsERCxAL BANx TRuST DE12 (1975).
18. In two private interpretative letters, the Comptroller authorized the
provision of financial counseling services by national banks. Apps. hA &
IIB p. 809 infra.
19. In those same letters the Comptroller also authorized limited bank
involvement in private placement activities. See text accompanying notes
31-66 infra.
PARThmNTS
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in character, ranging from demand to ninety-day loans. Since then,
banks have gradually increased the maturity of their loans so that
long-term loans (those exceeding one year in maturity) now constitute more than forty percent of industrial and commercial loans
of major commercial banks,20 and borrowings with much longer
maturities (exceeding five years) constitute a significant portion of
such loans.2 1 Frequently, these loans are made through syndicates
of banks which contain from a handful to a substantial number of
domestic, and sometimes foreign, banks. Syndicated bank loans are
effected for domestic and foreign borrowers and are extended both
by United States banks and their overseas affiliates.
In addition to providing long-term funds themselves, banks have
become quite active in arranging, for a fee, private placements of
securities of all types, from long-term bonds to equities, with a variety of institutional lenders. Although some of the commercial
banks most active in the private placement of securities-for example, Morgan Guaranty, Crocker National and Manufacturers Hanover-do not report the extent of those activities, during 1975, those
which did not report were involved in over $500 million of private
placements. 22 In some instances, banks participate in private place20. 62

FED.

RES. BULL., Feb. 1976, at app. 23.

21. According to the Treasury Issues Paper, on Apr. 30, 1975, 140 national banks having deposits in excess of $25D million reported that 10.75%
of their industrial and commercial loans had maturities of greater than five
years. TRsEsuRY IssuEs PAPER, supra note 6, at 10.
22. As reported by Investment Dealers' Digest, the following banks were
engaged in private placement activities during 1975:
Amount
Number of Issues
Advisor
(00)
$231,590
4
Citibank N.A.
138,947
19
First National Bank of Chicago
81,000
6
Northern Trust Company
38,476
3
Chase Manhattan Bank
Manufacturers National Bank
5,000
1
of Detroit

Hibernia National Bank New Orleans

Marquette National Bank Minneapolis

Total

2

4,700

1

2,045

36

$501,758

As compiled from the Investment Dealer'sDigest (1975 & 1976 issues). Business Week reports that although they do not reveal their dealings, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company, Crocker National Bank, and Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company are active in the private placement field. Morgan is
characterized as "[p]robably the leader in bank practice placements."

Merchant Banking, Is the U.S. Ready For It?, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 19, 1976, at
54,64,

ments they have arranged by purchasing for portfolios under their
management a portion of the securities to be sold, 23 and on occasion
a bank will assemble for a customer a financing package consisting
of a medium-term loan from the bank itself, together with a private
placement to provide the ultimate long-term financing.
Because the legal restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act do not
24
apply to the foreign securities activities of United States banks,
those banks have been engaging in an ever-increasing range of investment banking activities overseas..2 5 Through foreign branches,
Edge Act [41 Stat. 378 (1919) ] corporations, and investments in foreign banks, United States banks participate in large syndicated
bank loans to foreign borrowers 2 and Eurobond underwriting syndicates, 27 in addition to offering financial counseling services.

For over thirty years, U.S. commercial banks had been largely
content with confining themselves to accepting deposits and lending
money, but beginning in the 1960's commercial banking underwent
a radical change. 28 The large money-center banks aggressively
sought funds through new deposit instruments, such as certificates
of deposit, and began to extend the term of their loans. Then, with
the advent of the one-bank-holding-company concept as a catalyst,
these banks expanded into new fields, such as consumer finance,
foreign merchant banking, and mortgage origination, in search of
outlets for those funds.
If recent patterns of activity and development by the major commercial banks continue, it appears likely that these banks will attempt to extend their activities in the securities industry during
the next decade. Brokerage and advisory services in particularwhich require principally personnel and office space-are especially
attractive to many of the large banks because they can afford the
opportunity to offer a "full-line" of financial services to gain an
23. E. HERMAN, supra note 17, at 47-48.
24. These restrictions are discussed more fully in text accompanying
notes 31-48 infra.

25. See C. WELLES, THE

LAST DAYS OF THE CLUB
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(1975); The Lessons

Banks Learned from Overseas Misadventures, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 19, 1976, at
104.
26. See advertisements App. III p. 813 infra.
27. Eurobonds are securities publicly offered by an international underwriting syndicate in more than one country. Of the 173 Eurobond offerings
in 1975, it was reported that Manufacturers Hanover Ltd., an affiliate of
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, participated in 159, Citibank's foreign affiliate in 128, Bank of America's in 99, Bankers Trust's in 48, and
First Chicago's in 36. The Lessons Banks Learned from Overseas Misadventures, Bus. WEEK, Apr. 19, 1976, at 104.
28. See generally Merchant Banking, Is the U.S. Ready For It?, id. at 54.
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edge in the intense competition for both depositors and commercial
customers.
The combination of the competitive advantages enjoyed by
banks2 with their natural interest in the securities industry sug-

gests that participation in the industry by the major banks is likely
to increase in the absence of legislative or regulatory restrictions.
These banks can surely be expected to employ their advantages
with the same degree of imagination they exhibited in utilizing the
one-bank-holding-company mechanism to diversify despite the restrictions on that concept imposed by the 1970 amendments to the
30
Bank Holding Company Act.

LEGAL STATUS OF BANK SECURITIES ACTIVITIES
General
The Glass-Steagall Act (Act) was enacted in 1933 in reaction to
congressional findings that there were many abuses by banks in
the securities industry. During the decade following World War
I, banks expanded into the securities industry through the formation of securities affiliates. Not only did these affiliates fuel the
speculation of the late 1920's, but they also diverted valuable finan31
Furthercial and managerial resources from the parent banks.
more, securities underwritten by bank affiliates frequently were
purchased by the affiliated banks themselves, often for their trust
29. These advantages are discussed in text accompanying notes 78-94
infra.
30. Instead of serving as a deadly barrier between banking and other
businesses, the 1970 "one-bank holding company" law is coming to
look more like the gateway to a promising new land of profits and
power. By setting up holding companies, many banks now find
it possible to move into lucrative new ventures ranging from the
operation of insurance agencies to computerized payroll processing.
Janssen & Foldessy, Holding-Firm Law Designed to Limit Banks Instead
Opens New Finance-Service Vistas, WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1972, at 24, col.
1. "Thanks to the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956, commercial lending institutions gained both incentives and authorization to widen their corporate horizons." Anreder, Beautiful Balloon?
Bank Holding Companies Embark on Frantic Expansion, 3 BARRON'S, Apr.
29, 1974, at 3.
31. The possibility of spectacular profits from securities affiliates caused
the principal officers of many banks to establish such affiliates. H. BuRNs,
THE AmICAN BANING CommuNirY AND NEW DEAL BANKING REFORMS:
1933-1935, at 64 (1974).

accounts, and sometimes were "unloaded" on correspondent banks. 32

These purchases weakened the financial stability of the banks themselves.
Because the public associated the bank securities affiliates with
their parent banks, their financial plight in the wake of the stock
market crash of 1929 seriously undermined public confidence in
banks and the banking system. The failure of the Bank of the
United States in 1930 was widely attributed to that bank's activities
with respect to its numerous securities affiliates. 33
The powers of national banks3 4 are enumerated in section 16 of
the Glass-Steagall Act. Such banks also may exercise all incidental
powers necessary to carry on the business of banking; 3r however,
dealing in securities by national banks is expressly limited to "purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse,
solely upon the order, and for the account of, customers, and in
no case for its own account, and the [bank] shall not underwrite
any issue of securities or stock. . . ."36 Moreover, anyone "engaged
in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling, or distributing" securities is prohibited by section 21 of the Act from engaging in "the
business of receiving deposits subject to check or to repayment upon
presentation of a passbook, certificate of deposit, or other evidence
of debt, or upon request of the depositor . . . ,,13In addition, by
virtue of the Act, all member banks3 8 are prohibited from being
affiliated with securities firms, 39 and no individual who is an officer, director, employee, or partner of a securities firm may be an
officer, director, or employee of a national bank.40 To complete the
statutory pattern, bank holding companies are limited to engaging
32. See Landmark Law that Boxes In the Banks, Bus.

WEEK,

Apr. 19,

1976, at 56.
33. Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971).

34. Banks may be subject to regulation by a variety of regulators, both

federal and state. Because most of the banks active in offering securities
services are either national banks or subsidiaries of bank holding companies,
this section will focus on federal banking regulation.
35. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. V 1975).
36. Id.
37. Id. § 378 (a)(1) (1970).
38. Every national bank is required to be a member of the Federal Reserve System. Id. § 222. ,
39. Id. § 377. "[N]o member bank shall be affiliated in any manner
...with any corporation, association, business trust, or other similar organization engaged principally in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale,
or distribution at wholesale or retail or through syndicate participation of
.
stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities ...

40. Id. § 78.
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in banking and activities closely related to banking as defined in
section 4 (c) (8) of the Bank Holding Company Act. The Federal Reserve Board (FEB) has read into the Bank Holding Act the provisions of the Act prohibiting banks from providing securities services.

41

It is clear that one of the Act's purposes was to prohibit commercial banks from entering the investment banking business. 4 2 Congress was familiar with the practice of many banks in establishing
securities affiliates that had engaged in the business of floating
bond issues and, on occasion, underwriting stock issues, and determined that bank involvement with the speculative securities prevalent at the time damaged not only the financial stability of the
banks, but also of the nation. It was feared that the responsibility
of banks to make disinterested credit decisions might be impaired
by pressures resulting from bank affiliation with securities firms.
In addition, Congress was clearly concerned about the conflicts of
interest stemming from such affiliation. Finally, it is apparent
Congress feared that loss of depositors' confidence in the banking
institutions, which could be heightened as a result of their securities involvement, would have a serious detrimental effect on the
national economy.
In Investment Co. Institute v. Camp,4 3 an association of openend investment companies and several individual companies challenged both a regulation of the Comptroller of the Currency which
authorized banks to operate collective investment funds and the
Comptroller's approval of a First National City Bank collective
investment fund. Under First National's plan, the bank customer
tendered between $10,000 and $500,000 to the bank, together with
an authorization naming the bank the customer's managing agent.
The customer was then issued written evidence of his participation
which was freely redeemable and transferable to anyone who had
executed the bank's managing agency agreement. The fund, which
was registered as an investment company under the Investment
Company Act of 1940, was managed by the bank as investment ad44

visor.

41. See 12 C.F.R. § 225.125 (b) (1977).
42. See App. I p. 800 infra.

43. 401 U.S. 617 (1971).
44. Id. at 622-23.

The Supreme Court found that the bank's activities were substantially equivalent to operation of a mutual fund and that, on their
face, sections 16 and 21 of the Act prohibited this activity by
national banks. 45 Nevertheless, it proceeded to explore thoroughly
the legislative intent of the Act. The Court found that Congress
wanted to keep commercial banks out of the investment banking business "largely because it believed that the promotional incentives of investment banking and the investment banker's pecuniary stake in the success of particular investment opportunities
was destructive of prudent and disinterested commercial banking
and of public confidence in the commercial banking system."' 4" In
passing the Act, Congress was motivated by more than the obvious
danger that banks would invest their assets in imprudent investments. 47 Congress believed it was imperative to eliminate the
temptations banks would face upon entering into investment banking which could impair their ability to function as an impartial
source of credit. A bank, for example, might well fear that it would
be discredited in the public's view if its securities affiliate did
poorly. Accordingly, it might be tempted to shore up its affiliate's
finances in several ways: by making unsound loans or providing
other aid to the affiliate, by lending money or extending credit to
those companies in which the affiliate had invested, or by lending
money to a third person to finance its purchase of the affiliate's
investments. Furthermore, the Court perceived a strong concern
on the part of Congress over the "plain conflict between the promotional interest of the investment banker and the obligation of the
commercial banker to render disinterested investment advice."48
And, perhaps most importantly, the loss of goodwill resulting from
customers' suffering losses on investments purchased in reliance on
the bank's name would result in a loss of the bank's reputation
which would impair national confidence in the entire banking industry and, ultimately, the national economy.
Thus, the Court recognized the serious public policy issues which
arise not only when banks enter the business of investment banking
but also whenever banks determine to enter fields outside the business of commercial banking. The principles enunciated by the
Court in Camp are a prerequisite to proper analysis of the legality
of various bank securities services.
45. Id. at 625.
46. Id. at 634.

47. In fact, the securities affiliates had often operated without direct access to the bank's assets.
48. 401 U.S. at 633.
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Investment Banking
Although it is clear that the Act at least forbids bank participation in the underwriting of non-exempt securities, 49 the legality of
bank involvement in other investment banking services is uncertain. Indeed, certain investment banking services have been found
by the Comptroller of the Currency to be incidental to banking and
therefore permitted to a national bank.
For example, the Office of the Deputy Comptroller of the Currency has issued two letters which take the view that banks may,
with certain limitations, engage in private placement activities. In
the view of the Deputy Comptroller, a bank may properly provide
assistance to a customer in determining long-term financial objectives. Incidental to this function, therefore, a bank may convey
to this customer names of potential participants in a private placement and even may make preliminary inquiries of investors to ascertain interest in the issue. The bank may not, however, participate in the actual negotiations between the customer and the purchasers, for acting as a middleman is the "heart of the investment
banking business." Moreover, because the Office of the Deputy
Comptroller recognizes that a bank clearly cannot participate in a
"best efforts" underwriting, it may not charge a fee for its services
contingent upon a successful private placement, for "the levying
of such a fee is a strong incentive for the bank to locate a purchaser
with whom a deal can be made."
A persuasive argument can be made, however, that banks may
not provide their customers with private placement services. As
discussed above, 50 both sections 16 and 21 of the Act prohibit banks
from underwriting any issue of non-exempt securities or stock. Because arranging private placements of securities appears substantially similar to "best efforts" underwriting, and in a sense results
in a "distribution" of those securities, it would seem that a bank
would transgress the prohibitions of those two sections by providing
private placement services.
Moreover, the preceding analysis of the Act strongly suggests that
Congress intended to prohibit bank participation in private place49. The decision in Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971),
rested on the Supreme Court's finding that the offering of commingled
agency account services by a bank constituted an illegal underwriting.
50. See text accompanying notes 35-37 supra.

ment activities. One of the primary functions of investment banking, after all, is the distribution of securities, whether by public
offering or by private placement; and the dangers Congress intended to prevent by divorcing investment banking and commercial
banking-including imprudent extensions of credit, diversion of
bank personnel from commercial banking, conflicts of interest and
undermining of public confidence in banks-are the same dangers
that arise when banks engage in private placement activities. For
example, a bank may find itself pressured by those who participated
in a private placement arranged by the bank to make imprudent
loans to the issuer to assuage the participants' dissatisfaction with
their investment. Serious conflicts of interest also may arise when
a bank attempts to place privately securities with accounts managed
by its trust department. 51
The limitations on bank involvement contained in the Deputy
Comptroller's letters-no direct negotiation, no contingent fee-apparently stem from his recognition that such direct participation
involves the bank in the promotional aspects of securities marketing
which the Act expressly banned. The promotional problems, however, may arise even within the limits of permissible activities.
Since a bank has a clear interest in the success of a placement, it is
difficult to understand how realistically it may make even "preliminary inquiries" of potential investors or participate to an "insubstantial" extent in negotiations without at the same time marketing
the securities. The factors which underlie the Deputy Comptroller's objection to a contingent fee exist whenever a bank participates in a private placement, since the size of the bank's future
placement fees-from that client and other prospective clients-relates directly to its reputation for successful placements. Thus, the
concerns expressed in the Deputy Comptroller's letters provide
grounds for concluding that banks should not, to any extent, engage
in private placement activities.
Other types of financial consulting by banks, apart from private
placement activities, similarly raise questions of legality. Although
providing financial advisory services in connection with extending
short-term loans would appear properly to be incidental to the business of banking, it is by no means clear that other financial advisory
services customarily provided by commercial banks, such as advice
on mergers and long-term financings, are properly within a bank's
incidental powers. For example, the FRB has ruled that bank holding companies may not provide management consulting services51. See E. HEnm", supra note 17, at 47-48.
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including advice or analysis as to a firm's planning operations, such
as corporate acquisitions and mergers, and determination of longterm and short-term goals-because it does not regard such services
as being "closely related to banking" under section 4(c) (8) of the
Bank Holding Company Act. 52 Although the FRB's enumeration
of non-permissible management consulting services5 3 does not expressly encompass all financial advisory services, the rationale of
its ruling supports the proposition that national banks may not
properly engage in such services (except those incident to the extension of short-term credit).
Finally, although extending long term loans in itself does not
seem to exceed the banking powers of national banks, under certain
circumstances this practice could be subject to question. As noted
above, section 21 of the Act prohibits a bank from "underwriting,
selling or distributing, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate
participation, stocks, bonds, debentures, notes, or other securities
....

Presumably, an ordinary bank loan would not constitute

a "security" within the meaning of this section; however, the distinction between a loan and a security depends on the characteristics of the instrument creating the obligation and, more importantly, on the circumstances surrounding its sale.
A recent Ninth Circuit case has explored this distinction in the
context of when a bank loan may be a security for purposes of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.55 Under the rationale of the
case, this question turns on whether repayment of the loan depends
on the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of another person; if
it does, a security is likely to be involved. Among the factors considered relevant to this determination are the length of the loan,
whether the obligation is issued to a single investor or a group of
investors, the size of the debt relative to the business, and the extent of the obligation's collateralization.
It would appear that some syndicated long-term bank loans might
constitute securities under such a test. Accordingly, the syndication process itself could be deemed an illegal distribution of securities under section 21.
52. 12 C.F.R. § 225.125(f) (1977).
53. Id. § 225.4 (a)(5) n.3. This enumeration is not deemed exclusive.
54. 12U.S.C. § 378(a) (1) (1970).

55. Great W. Bank & Trust v.Kotz,532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976).

"Furthermore, although generally the provisions in long-term
bank loan agreements are appropriate for protecting the bank's investment, in some cases those provisions may give banks such a
degree of influence over the borrower that the loan and the agreement have attributes similar to a prohibited equity investment. 0
Brokerage Related Services
The legal status of one form of brokerage service offered by banks
is currently the subject of litigation: the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) and the Investment Company Institute (ICI) have appealed the district court's decision granting the Comptroller's motion for summary judgment in their case challenging the Comptroller's interpretative letter permitting banks to offer AIS's." 7 That
interpretation 58 reviewed the provision of section 24 of title 12
which states that "[t] he business of dealing in securities and stock
by the [bank] shall be limited to purchasing and selling such securities and stock without recourse, solely upon the order, and for the
account of, customers," 59 and concluded that the plain meaning of
the words permits banks to purchase and sell stock as agent for
customers, precisely the activity involved in AIS's. It further determined that the creation and management of an AIS by a bank
did not involve the business of underwriting, selling, or distributing
securities in contravention of section 378 of title 12.
The NYSE and ICI, however, maintained that the statutory language permits agency transactions, but only when done as an accommodation for the customer and at or below the bank's costs. °0
Moreover, they argued, the Act did not intend for banks to promote,
advertise and solicit participation in such services nor to use such
services to attract new banking customers.
The district court's decision was based largely on the doctrine
that courts should give great weight to an agency's interpretation
of a statute for which the agency has administrative responsibil56. National banks are prohibited from purchasing for their own account
equity securities. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. V 1975). Similarly, bank holding
companies may not purchase stock of a company which is not a bank or
engaged in a business closely related to banking. Id. § 1843 (a) (1970).
57. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975),
following opinion of James E. Smith, Comptroller of the Currency, expressed in a letter to G. Duane Vieth (June 10, 1974), reprinted in [1974]
FED.BANKING L. REP. (CCH)
96,272 at 81,359.
58. Letter from James E. Smith, Comptroller of the Currency, to G.
Duane Vieth (June 10, 1974), reprinted in [1974] FED. BANKING L. REP.
(CCH) 96,272 at 81,353.
59. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. V 1975).
60. NYSE's & ICI's Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Cross Motion
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ity.01 This doctrine has not rescued other interpretations promul02
Furthermore, the fact that the chalgated by the Comptroller.
lenged interpretation marks a reversal of the Comptroller's earlier
view 3 casts further doubt on the current interpretation. While the
legislative history is ambiguous on this point, the intent of the Act,
as articulated by the Supreme Court in Investment Co. Institute
v. Camp,64 suggests that the very risks the Act sought to eliminate-loss of public confidence in the banks, conflicts of interest, and biased credit judgments-arise when the bank has a salesperson's stake in its investment services through offering an AIS

plan.0Y
Regardless of the outcome of the case, however, the critical question is not the legality of AIS or dividend reinvestment plans; it
is the legality of the full-scale brokerage services that at least one
66
Through
major commercial bank has disclosed plans to offer.
these services, banks would seek to reach more customers than they
do with AIS plans and such services would receive a full-scale profor Summary Judgment at 27, New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404
F. Supp. 1091 (D.D.C. 1975).
61. New York Stock Exch., Inc. v. Smith, 404 F. Supp. 1091, 1096-97
(D.D.C. 1975), citing Investment Co. Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 626-27
(1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
16 (1965).
62. During the past decade numerous interpretative rulings promulgated
by the Comptroller have been overturned by the courts: Investment Co.
Inst. v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) (mutual fund); First Nat'l Bank v.
Dickinson, 396 U.S. 122 (1969) (armored car services); Arnold Tours, Inc.
v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972) (travel agency); Nat'l Retailers Corp.
of Arizona v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 411 F. Supp. 308 (D. Ariz. 1976) (data
processing); Georgia Ass'n of Ind. Ins. Agents, Inc. v. Saxon, 268 F. Supp.
236 (N.D. Ga. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Ind. Ins.
Agents, Inc., 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968) (insurance agency); Baker,
Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966), aff'd sub nom. Port
of New York Auth. v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
(underwriting municipal revenue bonds).
63. Originally, the Comptroller interpreted this provision to prohibit
banks from purchasing or selling securities for a customer's account except
as an accommodation to the customer. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY,
BuLL. No. 2, at 2-3 (Oct. 26, 1935).
64. This legislative intent argument is more fully set out in the NYSE
& ICI Memo, supra note 60, at 12-25.
65. The same considerations would appear to apply with equal force to
dividend reinvestment plans and the limited direct brokerage in which
banks are currently engaged.
6. See note 15 supra.

motional and advertising campaign. Such services clearly would
involve many of the problems the Act sought to remove.
Investment Advisory Services
Investment advisory services seem to be properly incidental to
the trust activities of a bank, and no legal basis for challenging
such activities appears to exist so long as they are performed by
the bank's trust department independent of its commercial department.
PoLicy RrASONS FOR RESTRICTING BANK SEcuRiTIEs AcTIVITIES
This section will explore some of the fundamental policy issues
raised by bank participation in securities activities. To develop
these issues in the proper context, we shall begin with a discussion
of some of the objectives for national policy respecting the banking
and securities industries.
PublicPolicy Objectives
As articulated in the Introduction to this paper, we believe an
appropriate list of major policy objectives would include the following: (a) to promote maximum efficiency in the capital markets, 67
(b) to create an environment in which financial institutions have
both the incentive and the ability to meet the rapidly changing demands of our economy, (c) to create a climate in which public trust
in intermediating institutions is high,68 (d) to encourage widespread
direct public ownership of United States industry, 69 (e) to promote
fair competition not only within markets but also between markets
for substitute products, 70 (f) to limit the economic and political
power of any one sector, 71 and (g) to protect investors and depositors against improper practices.7 2 The first four goals relate to the
67. This objective is discussed more fully in text accompanying notes 7477 infra.

68. J. Lorie, Public Policy for American Capital Markets 4-5 (prepared
for submission to the Secretary & the Deputy Secretary of the Treasury)
(Feb. 7, 1974).
69. Id.

70. The preamble to the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, states as its
purpose to "control their future expansion, and require divestment of their
nonbanking interests." 70 Stat. 133 reprinted in [1956] U.S. CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEws 169. See S. RFP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2nd sess., reprinted in
[1956] U.S. CoDE CONG. & AD. N-ws 2482.
71. Id.
72. The preamble to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 states in part:
For the reasons hereinafter enumerated, transactions in securities
as commonly conducted upon securities exchanges and over-the-
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need to maximize our capital-raising ability in order to satisfy the
nation's immense capital needs: 73 Goals (a) and (b) are concerned

with institutional efficiency and flexibility; goal (c) relates to the
highly developed sense of public confidence in our financial intermediaries which is a necessary precondition to use of such intermediaries for savings and investment; and goal (d) refers to the
direct equity ownership which gives the public a stake in the free
enterprise system. Achievement of these goals, it is urged, would
produce the conditions necessary for sustained economic growth and
a high level of employment. Goals (e), (f), and (g) also are vital
because of our national commitment to commercial fair play and
our democratic tendency to avoid massive aggregations of power
in any individual, corporation, institution, or industry.
These goals frequently may be in conflict, and reconciliation often
is necessary. Nevertheless, a workable compromise among them
should be attainable. For example, a reasonable balance between
promoting economic efficiency and limiting concentration can be
struck by limiting the areas of direct competition between different
types of institutions while encouraging these institutions to offer
close substitutes for one another's products, subject to certain constraints, and providing for easier entry by other types of competitors into each of the restricted markets. Similarly, investor protection through full and fair disclosure need not be inconsistent with
public confidence in intermediaries. Some would argue, in fact,
that disclosure eventually improves corporate behavior and thus enhances public confidence.
The remaining subsections discuss the desirability of separating
the banking and securities industries to maximize attainment of the
above policy objectives.
Role of Banks and SecuritiesFirms in CapitalMarkets

Much of the banking legislation of this century has been a response to the perceived need to foster and maintain the stability
counter markets are affected with a national public interest which
makes it necessary to provide for regulation and control of such
transactions and of practices and matters related thereto, ... to
insure the maintenance of fair and honest markets in such transactions.
15 U.S.C. § 78 (b) (1970).
'73. Business Week estimates that during the decade 1975-1984, $4.5 trillion
in capital investment will be needed by the economy, nearly three times
the $1.6 trillion consumed in the 1965-1974 decade, Capital Crisis: The $4.5
Trillion America Needs To Grow, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 22, 1975, at 42, 43.

and soundness of the banking system. The Federal Reserve Act
of 1913 was enacted in response to the banking panic of 1907, and
the Glass-Steagall Act was enacted to deal with the role of banks
in the credit excesses of the 1920's that contributed to the collapse
4
of the nation's economy and numerous bank failures in the 1930's.7

The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, as amended in 1970, reflected congressional concern that banks through bank holding
companies would diversify into businesses which could jeopardize
7

their financial stability.

5

The role of the securities industry in our capital markets is
equally vital to the economy.70 The underwriting network makes
new capital available to government and industry, and the secondary markets operate to provide a highly efficient mechanism for
valuing and transferring ownership of securities. Indeed, one of
the principal purposes of the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975
was to promote the efficiency of the securities markets.77
74. The Senate committee which reported the bill that became the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 stated that:
The chief purposes of the banking and currency bill is to give
stability to the commerce and industry of the United States, prevent financial panics or financial stringencies; make available effective commercial credit for individuals engaged in manufacturing,
in commerce, in finance and in business to the extent of their just
deserts; put an end to tle pyramiding of the bank reserves of the
country and the use of such reserves for gambling purposes on the
stock exchange.
S. REP. No. 131, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 2, at 7 (1913). The preamble to
the conference report which accompanied the bill that was enacted as the
Banking Act of 1933 (the Glass-Steagall Act), 48 Stat. 162 (1933), stated
that the bill's purpose was "to provide for the safer and more effective use
of the assets of banks." H.R. REP. No. 254, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1933).
75. The report of the Conference Committee that reported the Bank
Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 noted the "mixing [of] banking
and nonbanking in complete contravention of the purpose of both Federal
banking laws going back to the 1930's and the Bank Holding Company Act
of 1956" and quoted with approval the following statement of the President:
Left unchecked, the trend toward the combining of banking and
business could lead to the formation of a relatively small number
of power centers dominating the American economy. This must
not be permitted to happen; it would be bad for banking, bad for
business, and bad for borrowers and consumers.
H.R. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970).
76. Public Policy for American Capital Markets, supra note 68, at 1.
77. The Report of the Joint Conference Committee on the Securities Acts
Amendments stated:
The securities markets of the United States are indispensable to
the growth and health of this country's and the world's economy.
In order to raise the enormous sums of investment capital that will
be needed in the years ahead and to assure that that capital is properly allocated among competing uses, these markets must continue
to operate fairly and efficiently. The increasing tempo and magnitude of the changes that are occurring in our domestic and interna-
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Economic Advantages Possessed by Banks
Financial intermediation by banks involves the accumulation of
savings as deposits and the lending of those funds to those with
capital needs. This transfer process is a primary economic function
of financial intermediaries. There are essentially two cost elements
in the intermediation of funds: (1) the rate of return required to
induce holders of idle funds to deposit them, and (2) the costs of
the intermediation process. The privileges that banks enjoy are intended to lower those costs so that those who need funds may obtain
them relatively inexpensively.
For example, federal deposit insurance serves to lower the rates
of return required to attract depositors by making bank deposits
up to prescribed levels virtually "risk free. ' 78 Such rates of return
also may be kept artificially low through governmental action when
legal interest ceilings or prohibitions on deposits are set at levels
below the rate that market forces would otherwise dictate.
Moreover, the direct costs of intermediation are reduced through
79
the favorable tax treatment accorded banks for interest expenses
and loss reserves,8 0 which increases their after tax income. 8 ' In
tional economy make it clear that the securities markets are due
to be tested as never before. Unless these markets adapt and respond to the demands placed upon them, there is a danger that
America will lose ground as an international financial center and
that the economic, financial and commercial interests of the Nation
will suffer.
H.R. REP. No. 229, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1975).

78. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) insures up to

$40,000 of each account. 12 U.S.C. § 1813(m) (Supp. V 1975).
79. Banks are permitted to deduct interest expenses incurred to hold taxexempt municipal bonds. Rev. Rul. 61-222, 1961-2 C.B. 58.
80. Although this provision is being gradually phased out, banks are permitted to reserve against future loan losses and to deduct such reserve from
gross income. I.R.C. § 585.
81. The following is a comparison of tax rates applicable to banks and
brokers:

1975, five of the ten largest bank holding companies had a negative
federal income tax liability on their worldwide income,8 2 and no
one of the ten had a tax liability to all governments in excess of
thirty-five percent of its worldwide income, 3 although the statutory corporate income tax rate in the United States is forty-eight
percent.
In addition, banks have ready access to short-term capital at low
cost through access to the federal funds market and the FRB's discount window. 84 The cost to banks of long-term capital also is
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Source: Speech by Alan F. Blanchard, former Executive Director of the
SEC, before the Carter Golembe Associates Executive Seminar
(Oct. 16, 1975) (The SEC, Banks and the Capital Markets 22A, on
file with the San Diego Law Review) [hereinafter cited as Blanchard Speech].
82. Chase Manhattan Corp.'s negative federal income tax liability constituted 31.7% of its worldwide income; Bankers Trust's was 4.5%; Chemical
New York Inc.'s 10.5%; Citicorp's 3.3%; and Manufacturers Hanover Inc.'s
7.1%. 4 TAX NOTES, Apr. 26, 1976, at 31.
83. The worldwide tax liability of each of the ten as a percentage of
worldwide income was: Bank of America, 31.3%; 'Bankers Trust, 15.1%;
Chase, 10.3%; Chemical, 2.6%; Citicorp, 29.8%; Continental Illinois, 28.7%;
Manufacturers, 9.9%; J.P. Morgan, 31.7%; Security Pacific, 9.6%; and Wells
Fargo, 15.0%. Id.
84. At a time when the prime rate, the rate charged a bank's best corn-
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lower because of reduced risks associated with investment in the
banking business. Such reductions in risk result in part from federal and state restrictions on entry into banking and the readiness
of the FRB to provide low cost credit through the discount window
to meet banks' temporary liquidity problems.
Economists would classify these special advantages and privileges
-deposit insurance, access to the discount window and the federal
funds markets, limitations on entry, interest rate ceilings, and tax
breaks-as "subsidies," the purpose of which is to lower the cost
of intermediation of funds and thus to lower the cost of funds to
borrowers. These privileges are paid for directly or indirectly by
the public.
For example, limited entry into the banking business reduces the
competition for deposits, thereby decreasing the rates earned by depositors, as against those that would prevail were there free entry.
Similarly, interest rate ceilings in respect of time deposits and interest prohibitions in respect of demand deposits eliminate price competition for deposits when 'they operate to prevent commercial
banks from having to pay what would be the market rate of interest
on such deposits. These differences in interest rates constitute income transfers in favor of such banks.
Other advantages are paid for by taxpayers indirectly when
banks are permitted to reduce their tax liabilities by deducting interest paid on funds borrowed to hold tax-exempt securities, a privilege not generally available to nonbank financial institutions.
These privileges are provided to banks in the expectation they
will be passed on to borrowers of funds, thus reducing borrowing
costs, making credit more freely available in the economy, and stimulating economic growth. It would constitute a clear departure
from the purpose of the privileges for banks to employ them in
nonbanking activities.
Moreover, it would be patently unfair if nonbanking entities were
forced to compete with banks without the benefit of such privileges.
To illustrate this point, one need only compare the cost of borrowed
funds to banks with the cost to broker-dealers. Broker-dealers demercial risks, was at 6-3/4%, the federal funds rate was approximately
4-%% and the discount rate was 5- %. WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1976, at
37, col. 1; 62 FED. RES. BULL., Apr. 1976, at app. 6.

I

pend on bank loans to provide a "margin" for their customers and
to carry securities during an underwriting; as of June 30, 1975, they
owed the large banks of New York City alone nearly $4 billion.,s
Under these circumstances, it is difficult to understand how brokerdealers could successfully compete with banks, for their effective
interest cost on borrowed funds is one to two percentage points
higher than the cost to banks (which translates into an effective
cost of funds of as much as twenty-five percent greater than the
cost to banks).86 It would be "like a dress shop that buys its goods
wholesale competing against another dress shop that must buy
'87
stock retail.
An even more telling example is provided by the experience of
the mortgage banking industry, in which many bank holding companies made acquisitions in the early 1970's. That industry is similar to the investment banking industry in that mortgage bankers
"underwrite" or inventory mortgages while looking for institutional
purchasers. In performing this function, independent mortgage
bankers suffer a distinct disadvantage in competing with mortgage
banking firms affiliated with banks. A large expense is the interest
cost of holding mortgages in inventory, but bank-affiliated firms
can finance their inventories with loans from their affiliated banks.
One of the anti-competitive impacts cited as having prompted the
FRB to disapprove Citicorp's retention of Advance Mortgage Corporation was the 1100% increase over two years in its extension of
credit to Advance. 8 Securities firms are placed at a similar disadvantage in competing with banks in underwriting general obligation
bonds.
Many other nonbanking enterprises owned by bank holding companies are financed by interest free funds from the holding company. Often in such cases the nonbanking activity would produce
little or no profit if it were charged for its funds at market rates.8 0
For example, had Citicorp charged its nonbanking subsidiaries at
least the cost to it of the funds it made available to those subsidiaries, they would have shown a net loss for 1975 instead of a $17
million profit. 0
85. 62 FED.REs. BULL., Feb. 1976, at app. 16.

86. For example, broker call money carried an interest rate of approximately 6% at a time when banks were paying only 4.8% on one month
certificates of deposit. WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1976, at 37, col. 1.
87. WELLES, supra note 25, at 391.
88. "This financial support following the subject acquisition permitted
Advance, in no small part, to improve its position significantly within the
mortgage banking industry." 60 FED. RES. BULL., Jan., 1974, at 50, 53.
89. WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
90. Citicorp made available to its nonbanking subsidiaries over $600 mil-
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Common sense suggests, and economic theory confirms, that
"competition" of this sort does not produce the social benefits normally expected to flow from competitive forces. 91
In the securities industry, banks have additional cost advantages
over securities firms which make direct competition particularly
unfair. Banks, for example, are not subj ect to the strict regulation
of their securities activities which add significantly to operating
92
costs for members of the securities industry.
lion interest free. Form 10-K filed by Citicorp with the SEC on March 30,
1976, at 13.
91. The major benefit of competition in an industry is the efficient allocation of scarce resources in that industry. However, such beneficial competition only occurs in the absence of structural defects in the organization of
an industry. Among the defects commonly recognized by economists is the
enjoyment of absolute cost advantages by certain members of an industry.
The interest cost advantage enjoyed by banks suggests that efficient competition would not occur were banks to participate in the securities industry.

See J. BAIN,

INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION,

260-63, 464-66 (2d ed. 1968).

92. See Table 2, infra.
TABLE 2
REGULATORY BURDENS

TO WHICH

MEMBERS OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY
ARE SUBJECT
BROKERAGE RELATED AND INVESTMENT BANKING SERVICES

1. Registration and licensing.
A. Registration with SEC as broker-dealer under section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
1. Filing of application.
2. Periodic financial statement filings.
3. Periodic fees.
B. Membership in National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(NASD).
1. Requirements for maintaining books and records.
2. Minimum capital requirements.
3. Membership fees and charges.
4. Compliance with "suitability" rules and other extensive Rules of
Fair Practices.
C. Membership on national securities exchanges.
1. Requirements for maintaining books and records.
2. Periodic financial reporting.
3. Minimum capital requirements.
4. Membership fees and charges.
D. Licensing of securities salespersons with NASD and exchanges.
1. Training.
2. Examination.
3. Bonding of employees.
2. Continuing regulatory obligations under Securities Exchange Act and
rules of self-regulatory bodies.
A. Minimum capital requirements (usually must be calculated daily).

Furthermore, banks have a ready and willing market of customers for their securities services: Every day millions of customers
stream across the threshold of the nation's banks to patronize banking services and regularly receive bank mailings in the form of
statements and bills. Because of their banking relationship with
these customers, which includes intimate knowledge of their financial position, banks are uniquely able to cull their customer lists
for likely prospects. In addition, the ability of banks to extend personal loans to corporate officers enables them to provide another
strong inducement to patronage of their services.
Without a suggestion that banks would engage in illegal tie-ins,
it also seems apparent that potential borrowers may patronize various securities services offered by their bank in the belief that their
patronage of those services enhances their creditworthiness with
the bank. Particularly when short-term credit becomes a relatively
scarce and valuable commodity, customers may feel obliged to be
"good customers" of their bank in all respects. The Conference
Committee that reported the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 specifically noted the possibility of this occurring:
Such tie-ins may result from actual coercion by a seller or from a

customer's realization that he stands a better chance of securing a
scarce and important commodity (such as credit) by "volunteering"
to accept other products or services rather than seeking them in
the competitive market place. In either case, competition is ad-

B. Rules regarding suitability of securities for an investor.
C. Rules governing the appropriateness of advertising materials and requiring pre-clearance.
D. Requirement of furnishing detailed conformation of purchases and
sales and periodic statements of accounts.
E. Contribution to Securities Investor Protection Corporation.
F. Rules requiring full disclosure of information regarding securities
sold to customers.
G. General rules regarding the duty owed by brokers to their customers
under the so-called "shingle" theory, which seeks to hold brokers to
high professional standards.
H. Duty of broker-dealer principals to supervise employees.
INVESTMENT ADvIsoRy SERvicEs

1. Registration and licensing.
A. Registration with SEC as investment adviser under section 203 of Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
1. Application.
2. Filing fee.
3. Books and records requirements.
2. Continuing regulatory obligations under Investment Advisers Act.
A. Rules governing the appropriateness of advertisements and requiring
pre-clearance.
B. Rules governing advisory contracts with customers.
C. Rules governing methods of calculating fees.
D. Rules requiring disclosure of capacity and prior consent when acting
as principal with investor.
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versely affected, as customers no93longer purchase a product or
service on its own economic merit.
This potential for voluntary tie-ins has aroused concern among
those responsible for protecting healthy competition in the economy
because its anticompetitive impact cannot be cured by regulation
or resort to the antitrust laws.9 4
Because of the unique advantages granted to banks to facilitate
their intermediation services and because of their other cost advan93. H.R. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1970).
94. As suggested by Richard W. McLaren, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, in his testimony before the Senate
Committee considering one-bank holding company legislation in 1970, the
only solution to this structural defect in the marketplace is a separation
of banking from nonbanking enterprises:
Bank expansion in other areas permits the carry over of economic
power into such endeavors. There is, of course, the obvious danger
of overt reciprocity or tying arrangements, as well as general favoritism of bank affiliates, particularly in times of tight money. Also,
and perhaps more important in terms of the need for present legislation, there are dangers which are of a more structural natureadverse competitive effects that would tend to develop naturally
without actual overt use of the economic power carried over from
the banking sphere.
I refer to a voluntary form of reciprocity or tie-in effect, where
a potential borrower may independently decide that, just because
he might possibly be under watch, it is in his best interest to patronize bank-affiliated enterprises in the hope of improving his
chances of obtaining credit from the bank on favorable terms, or
indeed at all.
This can be illustrated by an example. A potential loan applicant might voluntarily place his casualty insurance business with
a bank-affiliated insuror in hopes of improving his chances for a
mortgage loan on the insured property on favorable terms. This
would have the same effect as a coercive tie-in. Competition in
the tied product, insurance, would be lessened to the extent that
customers no longer purchased it entirely on its own economic
merit. One such merger might well trigger others and as a pattern
of such bank-insurance affiliations developed, market foreclosure
in the tied field would become more and more serious.
Such voluntary tying or tying effect, as we called it in a recent
case, is the product of market structure-not misconduct.
This structural problem is intensified because present antitrust
remedies appear inadequate to deal directly with it. There simply
is no illegal practice or conduct for a court to enjoin. Hence, we
must concentrate on avoiding a structure which gives rise to such
effects.
One Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970, Hearings Before the
Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong. 2d Sess. 239-40 (1970).
See also Mr. McLaren's remarks before the House Committee: The Bank
Holding Company Act Amendments: Hearings Before the House Comm.
on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 91-92 (1969).

tages vis-a-vis members of the securities industry, fair competition

in providing securities services between major commercial banks
and members of the securities industry may not be possible. Nonetheless, commercial bankers and investment bankers can continue
to compete indirectly on an equitable basis by offering users of capital two alternative types of financing. For most types of loans
offered by commercial banks, investment bankers will strive to remain competitive by devising a comparable security that can be sold
in the private or public capital markets. Thus, investment bankers
provide the alternative of commercial paper to the banks' shortterm loans. They also place medium-term public debt (five to
seven years) to compete with bank loans of comparable maturity.
Competition of this type produces innovation and efficiency while
providing businesspeople with a meaningful choice of capital
sources.
Concentrationof Economic Power in the Major Commercial Banks
If the incursion of the major commercial banks into the securities
industry goes unchecked, it is likely that they will come to dominate several aspects of that industry. In addition to the economic
advantages cited in the preceding section, the sheer size of these
banks in relation to the securities industry suggests that the securities industry would be unable to compete successfully against the
wealth of resources available to the money-center bankers. The
magnitude of the major banks in relation to the securities industry
is illustrated by the fact that the shareholders' equity of Citicorp,
Inc., the parent holding company of Citibank, N.A., was $2.074 billion at the end of 1974, almost as large as the $2.346 billion which
was the aggregate shareholders' equity and proprietors' capital at
that time of all members of the New York Stock Exchange'1
The possibility of bank dominance of the securities industry is
particularly worrisome because these banks already represent the
major intermediary institutions in the United States economy
through their commercial and trust departments. There are six
principal kinds of institutions in the economy that act as financial
intermediaries: (1) insurance companies, (2) thrift institutions,
(3) commercial banks, (4) trust companies (or trust departments
of commercial banks), (5) mutual funds, and (6) broker-dealers.
Various other kinds of intermediaries exist in the economy, such
as finance companies, commercial factors and mortgage banks, but
generally these are not major sources of intermediated funds for
business.
95. See Table 3 infra.
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Major banks dominate the nation's trust business. The trust departments of commercial banks manage over $400 billion in assets,
composed of personal trusts and estates and employee benefit and
pension plans. e6 In addition to these enormous trust assets, commercial banks have available for lending or other investment approximately $900 billion of their own funds.9 7 Thus, commercial
banks control over $1,300 billion of assets.9 8 This concentration of
TABLE 3
Comparison of Size of Members
of Securities Industry and Banks
Shareholders' Equity

($ Billions)
$21.4

22-1

4

20

All NYSE Members Carrying
Public Accounts
$3.2,
Debt
E. F. Hutton $2.3i Subordinated
Stockholders
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Merrill Lynch...-!

Ei

BROKERS

Bank of
America
Chase
Manhattan
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Source: Blanchard speech, supra note 81, at 18A.
96. TREASURY ISSUES PAPER, supra note 6, at 7.
97. FDIC, SUMMARY OF DEPOSITS nT ALL COMMERCIAL AND MUTUAL SAVINGS BANKs (1974). Insurance companies, the second largest type of asset
management institution, manage only an estimated $300 billion in assets.
98. If legislation similar to the Financial Institutions Act of 1975 [S. 1267,

control over financial assets is the more noteworthy because nearly
two-thirds of banks' trust assets are controlled by sixty banks, constituting only 1.5% of the number of insured commercial banks with
trust departments. 9 These same large banks constituted less than
.5% of all insured commercial banks but controlled over fifty-five
percent of commercial bank deposits. 10 0 These figures suggest that
an overwhelming amount of economic power is concentrated among
the very few largest banks.
Banks also have become major competitors in the finance company business, commercial factoring and mortgage banking. For
example, as of December 31, 1968, only two of the top ten mortgage
servicing firms were affiliated with a bank; 0 1 as of December 31,
1975, seven were so affiliated. 02 Only eight of the top fifty mortgage services were associated with banks in 1968,103 but in 1975,
twenty-six were.104 If banks were to use their competitive advantages to dominate the securities industry as well, virtually every
major source of business capital-except insurance companies and
mutual funds-would be controlled by a relatively limited number
of large commercial banks, a situation which currently prevails in
Europe.
It is widely recognized that the inflexibility of the European
credit lilarkets-for example, their limited ability to offer long-term
credits with fixed maturities-is a product of the lack of sufficient
public market -alternatives to the credit facilities of the commercial
banks. The public markets in the United States, which are supported by the confidence that comes from independent credit rating
agencies and detailed financial disclosure, impose a discipline on
borrowers. 10 5 The system quickly reveals financial weakness, and
94 Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) ]-repealing both interest rate ceilings on time deposits and restrictions on paying interest on demand deposits-were to
become law, commercial banks might be able to absorb some of the
deposits held by thrift institutions.
99. As of December, 1974. FDIC, TRUST AssETs OF INSURED CoM1mncAL
BAxs-1974, at 14 (1975).
100. As of June 30, 1974. Compiled from Annual Survey of Bank Performance, Bus. WEEK, Sept. 21, 1974, at 60-63, & 61; FED. RES. BULL., June
1975, at app. 14.
101. In order of dollar volume of permanent real estate mortgages. Am.
BANKER, May 7, 1969, at 22.
102. Id. Apr. 26, 1976, at 10 (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
103. Id. May 7, 1969, at 22.
104. Id. Apr. 26, 1976, at 10 (on file with the San Diego Law Review).
105. Address by Henry Kaufman, Partner and Member of the Executive
Committee of Salomon Brothers, before the Lombard Association (March
9, 1976) in London, England (The American Credit Markets Viewed from
an International Perspective, on file with the San Diego Law Review).
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the markets thus -act as a system of checks and balances, as well
as an important safety valve which reinforces the strength of the
private negotiated markets.1 0 6
The reason for concern over an undue concentration of financial
power in the major commercial banks is that such concentration
would involve control of the allocation of business capital in our
economy. 10 7 Under the scenario of such concentration, the large
commercial banks would be able to determine which enterprises are
to grow and which are not, and investment decisions might tend
to concentrate on a particular group of industries at the expense
of all others.' 08 The market can allocate capital efficiently only
106. "In the long run, this dual market structure contributes to the efficiency of American financial institutions." Id.
107. The commercial departments of banks are already providing well
over half of all external corporate financing through bank loans. (See Table
4 infra). This is partly the result of the increased number of long-term
loans extended by banks.
TABLE 4
Sources of External Corporate Financing
$53.9
$4.1
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Source: Blanchard speech, supra note 81, at 16A.
108. Otto Eckstein, former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, in the fall of 1974, stated the problem as follows:
More fundamentally, a healthy capital market promotes the competitiveness of the American economy. If the current stock market
situation were to persist, there would be increased concentration

when there is a broad base of investment decision-making; overconcentration of decision-making can result in an insufficient allocation
of capital to many deserving industries. Furthermore, there is the
increased danger that one area of enterprise may receive a substantial concentration of bank investment and then become unprofitable
(like the REIT industry); banks might have to face large writeoffs or substantially increase their reserves-a fact which could
make it more difficult for them to attract capital. For these reasons
as well, business must have a capital market alternative to the
banking system.
Conflicts of Interest
A bank's performance of various securities services may create
conflicts of interest adverse to its trust customers and other managed accounts, to its commercial customers, and to users of its securities services. Although most trust departments undoubtedly
strive to conduct their businesses in full compliance with the high
standards imposed by fiduciary law, serious conflicts can lead to
unconsciously distorted judgments. In the securities industry conflicts are dealt with by measures ranging from disclosure to outright prohibition; 1 9 in the banking business, controls are less
clearly defined and more readily waived.' 1 0
A bank's trust department, for example, might be inclined to purchase for its accounts securities which are the subject of a private
placement arranged by the bank for a corporate customer or, in
the case of municipal bonds, distributed by the bank as underwriter.
Furthermore, if a private placement proves a bad investment for
the participants, the bank's trust department might seek to obtain
for the issuer additional investments or loans from other managed
accounts in an attempt to assuage the dissatisfaction of the initial
investors.
of the economy. The largest companies tend to be the most credit-

worthy and have the ability to stand at the head of the line at the
lending windows of the large commercial banks. The banks would
become powerful as they are in Europe and Japan.
Quoted in address by Alan F. Blanchard, supra note 81, at 17.

109. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78h(c) (1970)

(written consent required before lending customers' securities); 15 U.S.C.
§ 78k(a) (1) (Supp. V 1975) (prohibition of executing exchange transactions
for managed accounts); 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d) (1970) (disclosure of capacity
in executing transactions); Rules 15cl-4 (disclosure of capacity and commission in executing over-the-counter transactions), 15cl-5 (disclosure of
relationship with issuer); 15cl-6 (disclosure of interest in distribution).
110. See 12 C.F.R. § 9.12(a) (1977).
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The allegations in the Microdot v. Irving Trust Co."' episode last
year point out one of the more dramatic examples of potential conflict stemming from a bank's securities services to its commercial
customers. 112 There Irving Trust allegedly revealed confidential
knowledge of the financial condition of its credit customer, Microdot, in the course of providing advisory services to General Cable
(another credit customer) in the latter's attempt to take over Microdot. Although determination of the facts must await adjudication,
the incident illustrates that there are many opportunities for a
bank, in the course of providing financial advisory services, to make
improper use of confidential information obtained from its credit
customers.
A bank also may have a conflict between its obligation to give
its financial advisory customers objective advice and its own interest as a banker in making loans. For example, when a corporation
seeks advice from a bank on raising capital, the bank may be
tempted to advise the corporation to take on increased bank borrowings, even though such terms may not be so favorable as those available in the public market.
There are also potential conflicts with respect to bank brokerage
customers. A bank, in providing AIS or dividend reinvestment
plan to customers, is in a position to enjoy the use of the pooled
funds without interest simply by a delay in placing orders. In some
instances, such a delay could result in less favorable execution for
such accounts. Similarly, the trust department can take advantage
of its knowledge of when an order for a pooled account will be
executed in placing orders for its managed accounts.
Investor Protection
Section 3(a) (4) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides
that the term "broker" means "any person engaged in the business
111. Index No. 01123/76 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. filed Jan. 21, 1976) (on file with
the San Diego Law Review).
112. Both the House and the Senate have conducted hearings on this attempted takeover. The House Financial Institutions Supervision, Regulation and Insurance Subcommittee of the Committee on Banking, Currency
and Housing held hearings on March 26, 1976. The Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee held hearings on this matter on February
16, 1976.

of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but

does not include a bank."1113 This statutory exclusion was based
on the congressional understanding that banks were prohibited
from engaging in the business of dealing in securities under the
1 14
Glass-Steagall Act.

Those who are classified as "brokers" under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 are required to conform to a comprehensive system of governmental and private regulation developed over the
years for the protection of investors. Among the standards and
safeguards provided under this system, but inapplicable to banks
and thus unavailable to their brokerage customers, are those relating to suitability, prompt execution, disclosure of adverse information, and insurance under the Securities Investor Protection Act.
Although it often is argued that banks, too, are subject to an elaborate regulatory scheme, the principal objective of bank regulation
is protection of depositors and trust customers, not investors,
whether they be holders of bank securities or customers of the
bank's securities department. Moreover, understandable reluctance
of regulators to unsettle the often delicate public confidence upon
which the banking system depends can result in a different standard of enforcement in respect of bank conduct of securities business.
Thus, permitting banks to furnish securities services is inconsistent
with the policy objective of safeguarding the interests of investorsa goal upon which investor confidence in the securities markets is
built.
Stability of the Banking System
The banking system plays an essential role in the capital raising
process, and maintenance of its stability is essential to the economy.
The history of the 1930's serves as a vivid reminder of our economy's
dependence on that confidence and its need for a strong banking
system. The stability of the banking system depends on three elements: Banks must (1) make prudent and disinterested loans and
investments, (2) maintain a relatively stable flow of revenue, and
(3) continue to enjoy the confidence of depositors.
The first of these elements is essential to bank solvency; sound
loans and other investments result from credit decisions which are
the product of an independent banking judgment. Second, bank
revenues must be maintained at relatively steady and predictable
113. 15 U.S.C. § 78c (a) (4) (1970) (emphasis added).
114. Hearings on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the House Comm. on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1934).
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levels 1 5 if banks are to be able to meet their operating expenses,
including the interest they pay for some of the funds they utilize,
and to attract long-term capital. Stable bank income typically has
been provided by the revenues generated from the extension of
short-term credit to commercial enterprises; to the extent banks
engage in nonbanking activities which may produce volatile or unpredictable levels of revenue, their ability to maintain a stable flow
of revenues may be jeopardized. Finally, the banking system depends on public confidence-the willingness of individual and corporate depositors to entrust their savings or idle funds to banks.
Public confidence stems, in part, from the public's perception of
the first two elements; however, it is also affected by nonquantifiable psychological influences. The performance by banks of nonbanking activities must therefore by analyzed against these three
critical elements of a sound banking system.
To the extent banks acquire an entrepreneur's stake in a commercial enterprise, conflicts of interest may impair their ability to make
prudent and disinterested credit decisions with regard to that enterprise. In addition, if a bank becomes associated with investment
vehicles like mutual funds or REIT's, it may be tempted to extend
favorable credit terms to those businesses which the fund or REIT
has invested in. 11 Former FRB Chairman William McChesney
Martin, in his 1969 testimony supporting legislation to remove the
one bank holding company exemption, observed that: "If a holding
company combines a bank with a typical business firm, there is
a strong possibility that the bank's credit will be more readily available to the customers of the affiliated business than to customers of
other businesses not so affiliated."' 17 This statement is true because bankers may find that their ability to grant scarce credit to
users of their other financial services is an important inducement
to potential customers to use those services. Even bank-sponsored
115. "Banks have found that earnings stability, one hoped-for benefit of
the holding company, has been particularly elusive." Foldessy, Holding
Firm Concept Turns Sour for Banks as Profits Fall Short, WALL ST. J.

Apr. 20, 1976, at 1, col. 6.
116. For example, Chase Manhattan Bank bought $160.6 million of loans
from the Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty Trust, for which it serves
as an investment adviser, in order to ease the financial burdens of the Trust.
Bus. WEEK, May 31, 1976, at 30.
117. S. REP. No. 1084, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).

plans for small investors, which customarily invest solely in blue-

chip equities, may influence a bank to make loans it might not
otherwise have made to prevent itself from being associated in the
minds of its customers with any decline in such securities. 118
The common bank practice of extending loans to REIT's for which
the bank or its affiliate provides investment advisory services and
sponsorship offers an illustration of the temptations to which banks
may.succumb. For example, Manufacturers Hanover was one of
thirteen banks which were parties to a $106.2 million extension of
credit to Citizens Mortgage Investment Trust, which is advised by
Citizens Mortgage Corporation, a subsidiary of Manufacturer's
holding company parent."19 Similarly, BT Mortgage Investors,
which is managed by BT Advisors, Inc., a subsidiary of Bankers
Trust New York Corporation, owed Bankers Trust $55.7 million at
June 30, 1975;120 and Chase Manhattan Mortgage and Realty Trust,
which is advised by Chase Manhattan Bank, had a line of credit
with that bank in August 1974.121 The Hamilton National Bank
of Chattanooga was declared insolvent by the Comptroller of the
Currency on February 16, 1976. Defaults in many of the nearly
$100 million in loans originated by a mortgage banking affiliate of
122
the bank reportedly were responsible for Hamilton's demise.
In addition, a bank's ability to purchase for its own account a
substantial portion of an offering of government securities it is underwriting may prejudice its judgment in bidding for such offer118. The SEC's Institutional Investor Study Report observed a correlation between bank business relationships (including creditor relationships)
with corporations and their portfolio holdings:
Some institutions, particularly banks, have personnel and business relationships with portfolio companies. These relationships
may tend to reinforce any power conferred as a result of stock
holdings. They also create potential conflicts of interest and the
possibility of misuse of inside information. Although the Study can
draw no general conclusions as to whether these adverse consequences actually occur or to what extent they may occur, it appears
that there is a strong statistical correlation between bank stock
holdings and personnel and business relationships.
SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND E43XCHANGE COMMISSION, 127 (summary vol. March 10, 1971). See SEC, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. pt.
2 (1971).
119. Prospectus of Manufacturers Hanover Corporation, June 19, 1975,
on file with the SEC May 21, 1975 (on file with the San Diego Law Review),
120. Prospectus of Bankers Trust New York Corporation, Sept. 17, 1975
(on file with the San Diego Law Review).

121. Prospectus of Chase Manhattan Corporation, Aug. 2, 1974 (on file
with the San Diego Law Review).
122. WALL ST. J., Feb. 17, 1976, at 6, cols. 1-3. The bank had also made
over $30 million in loans to other affiliates.
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ings. By the same token a bank may find a home in its own portfolio for securities it has underwritten which it might have declined
to buy from an independent source. As a result, a bank may find
itself burdened with securities in which it ordinarily would not or
should not have invested. Many banks currently are experiencing
the adverse effects of their extensive investments in general obliga123
tion bonds.
The term of a loan also must be considered a factor in analyzing
the prudence of the loan. As banks find themselves increasingly
in competition with investment bankers, their long-term loans to
corporate borrowers have been expanding, and in some cases their
own capital positions have become tight. Although banks have, to
a limited extent, utilized the capital markets for long-term funds,
their principal source of funds continues to be demand and other
short-term deposits. As the average maturity of their loans increases, prudent bank financial practice would dictate that such
loans be matched against equally long-term sources of funds. Failure to do so could lead to disastrous results. The Senate Banking
and Currency Committee observed, in 1932, that "[a] very fruitful
cause of bank failures, especially within the past two years, has
been the fact that the funds of various institutions
have been so
12 4
extensively 'tied' up in long-term investments.'
The second key element of bank stability is a steady source of
revenues. The dangers of banks becoming dependent on revenues
subject to volatile fluctuations in operating results led Congress to
adopt the 1970 amendments to the Bank Holding Company Act
which limit the scope of bank holding company operations to activities closely related to the banking business. 25 This same concern
motivated Congress in 1933 to restrict the ability of banks to assume
the risks inherent in underwriting and investing in corporate securities. 1'20 Although banks were permitted to underwrite general
obligation bonds because there were thought to be few risks involved in such underwriting, even this area of the securities industry has risks for banks: Shortly before its demise the Franklin Na123. Citicorp has lost over $400 million in market value of the state and
municipal securities it was carrying for its own investment at December
31, 1975. CITICORP [1976] ANN. REP., 24,
124. S. REP. No. 584, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1932).

125. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
126. See text accompanying notes 42-48 supra.

tional Bank lost $5.6 million in the value of securities "'which had
been carried in the bank's securities trading account,' or bond dealer
operations.' 12 7 Similar risks exist in the case of municipal revenue
bonds, which are backed only by the revenues of a particular enterprise. Accordingly, it would not appear desirable to permit banks
to increase their activities in an industry whose revenues are subject to extreme fluctuations as well as unpredictable risks. The
of income of the two industries is illustrated
relative stability
28
graphically.
The third element of bank stability is depositor confidence, which
may be affected adversely if banks become active in promoting a
variety of investment vehicles. For example, if banks sponsor mutual funds, REIT's or AIS's which fail to live up to investor expectation-not an unlikely possibility since such investments hardly
127. Foldessy, Franklin New York Puts Deficit at $60 million in First
Five Months, WALL ST. J., June 21, 1974, at 3, col. 1.
128. See Table 5 infra.

TABLE 5
Relative Stability of Income
14Federal Reserve Members

12-

10Net Earnings
as a Percent
of
Total Invested
Capital
8-

NYSE
Members Doing
Business
With the Public

4-*

2-

1965

66

67

6B

69

70

Source: Blanchard speech, supra.note 81, at 20A.

71

72

73

1974
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can be expected to be risk-free-the image of banks as riskless deposit-accepting institutions may be tarnished in the minds of the
public. Moreover, the confidence of corporate borrowers often is
as sensitive as that of individuals: The recent spate of bank failures
reportedly has prompted many corporate treasurers to narrow their
list of acceptable depository banks.
Any serious loss of public confidence conceivably could lead to
withdrawal of bank deposits, consequent diminution of the funds
available for credit, and the possibility of bank failures. 129 Our
economy surely cannot afford the devastating effect of such a shortage of bank credit.
Competitive Considerations
It is impossible to predict with certainty what will occur if banks
are permitted to expand their securities activities. Nevertheless,
the risks of undue concentration of resources, unfair competition,
heightened conflicts of interest, inadequate investor protection, and
possible damage to confidence in the banking system cannot be
taken lightly. Measured against the principal policy objectives set
forth above, it seems clear that the economy has little to gain and
much to lose from such a gamble.
Even if additional competition in the securities industry were desirable, it should not be provided by banks in view of the above
considerations; in fact, however, the brokerage industry already is
highly competitive.
The structural characteristics of a competitive industry commonly
accepted by economists include: (1) low seller concentration, (2)
lack of significant barriers to entry, and (3) low product differentiation.13 0 The brokerage industry scores high on all three counts.
First, the brokerage industry's membership is diffuse and relatively non-concentrated. Second, there do not appear to be sub129. Although federal deposit insurance has greatly increased public confidence in the banking system, banks can ill afford to have their images
tarnished. For example, the inability of a California bank holding company
to refinance $11 million in commercial paper so seriously undermined depositor confidence that heavy withdrawals forced the otherwise healthy
subsidiary bank to declare bankruptcy. Foldessy, Holding Firm Concept
Turns Sour for Banks As Profits Fall Short, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 1976, at 33,

cols. 1-2. Similarly, the FRB had to lend nearly $1.8 billion to cover depositor withdrawals when the Franklin National Bank's substantial foreign
exchange losses became publicly known. Welles, supra note 25, at 393-94.

130. BAIn, supra note 91, at 464-66.

stantial barriers to entry. 13 1 Generally, such barriers include the
absolute cost advantages discussed above, 1 32 significant economies
of scale, and high product differentiation. 133 Although banks enjoy
absolute cost advantages over members of the securities industry,
there are no apparent cost advantages enjoyed by members of the
securities industry over potential entrants. Furthermore, empirical
studies suggest that there are no significant economies of scale in
the securities industry. 34 Finally, there is relatively little product
differentiation in the securities industry; what little product differentiation existed in the industry as a result of the service competition in which brokers engaged during the period of fixed commission rates will undoubtedly wane as price competition continues to
Moreover,
flow from the May 1, 1975 unfixing of commissions. 13
the sharp decline in commission charges since May 1, 1975, and the
failure of a number of securities firms in the wake of that decline
attest to the intensity of the competition in the brokerage business.
Similarly, bank entry into revenue bond underwriting would add
little to the already strong competition among broker-dealers in this
area. Not only do revenue bond offerings receive on the average
over five bids per issue, but revenue bonds also generally receive
more bids per offering than do comparable bonds in the bank-dominated general obligation market. 36 The revenue bond underwriting industry also exhibits the structural features necessary for com137
petition discussed above with respect to the brokerage industry.
Indeed, the employment by the major commercial banks of their
unique advantages in the securities industry is likely to produce
non-productive, and even detrimental, competition in that industry.
The risk of increased economic concentration and the possibility of
significant damage to the capital raising mechanism argue strongly
for separating the two industries legislatively, as Congress attempted to do more than forty years ago.
131. During the years 1971 through 1974, an average of 210 securities
firms became members of the National Association of Securities Dealers,
Inc. each year.
132. See note 91 supra.
133. BAIN, supra note 91, at 255.
134. See R. WEST & S. TINc, THE ECONOMICS OF THE STOCK MARKET 134
(1971).
135. See Mann, The New York Stock Exchange: A Cartel at the End
of Its Reign, in PROMOTING COMPETITION IN REGULATED MARKETS 301, 311
(A. Phillips ed., The Brookings Institution 1975).
136. See note 81 supra. Testimony of Alvin V. Shoemaker, Hearings
on S. 1933 Before the Subcomm. on Securities, Senate Comm. on Banking. Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 347 (1974).
137. See Testimony of Professor Simon Whitney, Hearings, supra note
136, at 352-98.
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LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR CONSIDERATION

The legal analysis contained in this paper demonstrates the uncertainty under present law of the status of many bank activities in
the securities area, and it seems equally clear that the various regulators with responsibility for administering the banking laws have
done little to clarify the uncertainty. Set forth below for consideration are several legislative proposals which we believe should be
evaluated in light of the above discussion.
Broker-DealerActivities
In every major piece of banking legislation passed in this century,
Congress has indicated its desire that commerce and banking be
conducted separately. 138 However, many banks and bank holding
139
companies have continued to expand their commercial activities.
In many cases, these activities were authorized by banking regulators, only to be later found by the courts to be impermissible. 14 0
Because of the tendency of bank regulators to permit banks to extend their competitive advantages into fields outside of banking,
it is proposed that Congress declare unambiguously its intent to
keep the business of banking separate from other commercial activities.
In particular, it is proposed that banks be prohibited from engaging in broker-dealer activities. We have discussed earlier how the
offering by banks of private placement services and AIS and other
brokerage-related services may have a deleterious effect on the
economy. 14 Under the proposed legislation, in order to remove this
138. Federal Reserve Act of 1913, Dec. 23, 1913, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251; Banking Act of 1933, June 16, 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162; Bank Holding Company
Act of 1956, Pub. L. 89-485, 80 Stat. 236; Bank Holding Company Act
Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. 91-607, 84 Stat. 1760.
139. According to Senator Proxmire's statement introducing the Competition in Banking Act of 1975 (S. 2721), CONG. REc. S20790 (daily ed. Dec. 1,
1975), and based on court cases and private rulings by the Comptroller
of the Currency, it appears that banks have engaged, or attempted to engage, in the following nonbanking activities: (1) operating an insurance
agency, (2) underwriting securities other than those exempt under section
24 of Title 12, (3) privately placing non-exempt securities, (4) providing
financial counseling services, (5) providing investment advisory services to
closed-end investment companies, (6) operating mutual funds, (7) providing securities brokerage services, (8) operating travel agencies, (9) providing armored car services, (10) providing data processing services, and (11)
leasing automobiles.
140. See note 62 supra.
141. See generally text accompanying notes 67-137 supra.

possibility, banks would be prohibited from soliciting orders to purchase or sell securities other than those securities now explicitly
exempt from the restrictions of the Glass-Steagall Act.
Bank brokerage services would thus be limited to those for which
the bank provides the service solely at an existing customer's request as an accommodation-the result intended by the Act. Banks
would also be prohibited, for all intents and purposes, from engaging in private placement, as well as merger and acquisition activities.
Clarification of Glass-Steagall Prohibition on Bank Underwriting
MunicipalRevenue Bonds
Under the Act, banks are permitted to underwrite only general
obligation bonds-those backed by the general taxing power of the
issuing or guaranteeing jurisdiction-but not revenue bonds. In
recent years there have been proposals that the Act be amended
to exempt revenue bonds from its strictures. Those opposing such
an amendment have observed that the same risks perceived by the
Act's drafters in bank underwriting of corporate securities (and the
temptation for banks to place such securities in portfolios under
their management) exist in the case of revenue bonds, whose principal and interest are not backed by the general taxing power of
the issuer or guarantor and thus must depend on the fortunes of
a particular enterprise.
Recent events bear out the danger of expanding the Act's exemptions to permit banks to underwrite revenue bonds. The decline
in the municipal securities market not only has resulted in a paper
decline in the assets of many banks but also has affected the public's
confidence in numerous banks with sizeable investments in municipal securities. The FRB, which had espoused the underwriting of
revenue bonds by banks, recently changed its mind and, recognizing
the potentially deleterious effects, expressed reservations about permitting banks to underwrite revenue bonds. 142 Moreover, as discussed above, 143 the entry of banks into the revenue bond underwriting business would not provide any beneficial increase in competition in that industry.
In addition, the Comptroller has interpreted the Act's exemption
142. Testimony of Jeffrey M. Bucher, member, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, Securities Activities of Commercial Banks, Hearings Before the Securities Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1975).
143. See text accompanying notes 136-37 supra.
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for general obligation bonds to include certain types of debt instru1 44
ments having the characteristics of revenue bonds.
It is proposed that the Act be amended to preserve and clarify
the distinction Congress intended to draw between revenue bonds
and general obligation bonds.
Implementation of a Clear and Definitive National Policy About
What Is and Is Not Permissible Bank Activity
Experience has shown that when banks are able to choose among
several regulators, each of which interprets and enforces the standard of permissible bank activities in a different manner, the possibility will exist that banks can gain more flexibility to expand their
activities by switching characters; 145 in fact, they may find themselves at a competitive disadvantage if they do not. Non-uniformity
of standards on a question of such importance contains the potential
to frustrate the attainment of national policy objectives in the banking industry. 146 Although it is not our intention to offer suggestions on the subject of bank regulation, one can make the general
observation that to preclude this problem, standards of permissible
activity must be formulated and applied in a uniform manner, perhaps by delegating interpretive and enforcement authority to a single bank regulator or to a joint body comprised of representatives
from each bank regulator.
CONCLUSION
The Securities Industry Association hopes that the issues addressed above will continue to be the subject of widespread discussion in Congress, elsewhere in government, and among members
of the public. We believe these issues must be faced squarely and
debated openly; in our view it would be a serious error to permit
them to be resolved by default or through the momentum of events.
We hope this response to the questions that current governmental
inquiries have raised will serve to stimulate further discussion.
144. See Baker, Watts & Co. v. Saxon, 261 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1966),
aff'd 392 F.2d 497 (1968).

145. See Bray, Did the Bank Switch Rather Than Fight the Fed Examin-

ers?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 26, 1975, at 1, col. 1, for a discussion of First Penn-

sylvania Bank's change from a state to a federal charter, allegedly to take
advantage of the Comptroller's more relaxed regulation. See Hackley,
Our Baffling Banking System, 52 VA. L. REv. 565 (1966), for a discussion

of 21 instances of disputes in the early 1960's between the Comptroller of
the Currency, the FRB and the FDIC.
146. See note 1 supra.

APPENDIX I
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE GLASS-STEAGALL

AND BANK HOLDING COMPANY ACTS

A review of the legislative history of the Banking Act of 1933
(the Glass-Steagall Act), the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,
and the Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970, evidences
both congressional recognition that the combination of banking and
nonbanking enterprises is inherently dangerous and a consistent
congressional intent to separate banking from other areas of commerce.
The Glass-SteagallAct
The Glass-Steagall Act (the Act) was a product of congressional
indignation over the role of national banks in fostering the prepanic
speculation leading to the national financial crises of the 1920's and
1930's. Congress felt that the Federal Reserve System had been
used to facilitate speculative securities operations and excessive
amounts of securities loans, in total disregard of the system's purpose.'
1. The outstanding development in the commercial banking system
during the prepanic period was the appearance of excessive security loans, and of overinvestment in securities of all kinds. The effects of this situation in changing the whole character of the banking problem can hardly be overemphasized. National banks were
never intended to undertake investment banking business on a
large scale, and the whole tenor of legislation and administrative
rulings concerning them has been away from recognition of such
a growth in the direction of investment banking as legitimate. Nevertheless it has continued; and a very fruitful cause of bank failures, especially within the past three years, has been the fact that
the funds of various institutions have been so extensively "tied up"
in long-term investments.
S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1933).
In this regard, Senator Glass, the Senate sponsor of the Act, speaking on
the Senate floor, stated that:
Not only has the Federal reserve banking system been used in
an inordinate measure in stock-market transactions but there appears to have been an extraordinary misconception by the administrators of the act of its real purpose. In large degree the system
has been transformed into an investment banking system, whereas
the fixed purpose of Congress was to set up a commercial banking
system and to preclude speculative operations ....
Let me tell [the] Senators the meaning, and, in the last analysis,
the result of that sort of administration of the law. It means that a
member bank may engage in any sort of speculative business it
may please, and then, when its reserve in the Federal reserve bank
is impaired, it may take its eligible paper for rediscount and use
the credit and the currency thus afforded to reestablish its reserve,
and not to relend for "commercial, industrial, or agricultural purposes."
That is an evasion of the intent, the spirit, and text of the Fed-
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The "gambling fever" of the prepanic years was attributed to the
2
rapid growth in the securities business of banks.
The establishment of securities affiliates, which, Senator Glass
said, made one of the "greatest contributions to the unprecedented
disaster which has caused this almost incurable depression,"-, had
become prevalent as banks became aware of the profits to be derived from the distribution of securities, 4 despite the fact that the
legality of the enterprise was at best questionable. 5 The report of
the Senate Committee chronicles the abuses that crept into the affiliate system. "The greatest of such dangers is seen in the growth
of 'bank affiliates' which devote themselves in many cases to perilous underwriting operations, stock speculation, and maintaining a
market for the banks' own stock often largely with the resources
of the parent bank."6
eral reserve banking act. It never was intended that its facilities
should be used for investment purposes, or for speculative purposes, in that roundabout way.
75 CONG. REc. 9884 (1932).

2. Senator Walcott, a member of the Senate Banking and Currency
Committee who addressed the Senate on the provisions of the Act relating
to bank affiliates, described this process to his colleagues:
It reached such a volume, there were so many willing purchasers,
so much credit for investment purposes was available that there
resulted a complete change in our banking system ....
The commercial banking business in consequence of this extraordinary volume of security business declined. . . . The net result of it all
was that we were in the flood tide of speculation ....
How was
all this expansion possible? . . . It took money, currency; it took
a very expansive credit, which, of course, brought in the banks. As
far back as 1911 the banks were investing heavily in securities, buying and selling securities. Most of the banks had been engaged in
underwriting, and still are. The security business became such an
important part of the operations of some of the banks, particularly
of two or three of our larger banks, that some fear was occasioned
that they would get away from the strictly commercial business
for which they were organized and put out securities of doubtful
value ....
[T]here was a conflict between the business of marketing securities and the business of protecting depositors! money
[T]he national banks engaged in the security business were
compelled to divorce their security business from their banking operations, and the term "affiliates" came into being as the result of
that divorce.
Id. at 9904.
3. Id. at 9887.
4. Id. at 9910 (remarks of Senator Bulkley).
5. Id. at 9911.
6. S. REP. No. 77, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1933).
As Senator Glass described it:
They sent out their high-pressure salesmen and literally filled the

The practice of the Bank of the United States in creating affiliates
was cited as a "typical case of the excessive abuse of affiliates."
Numerous undercapitalized affiliates were created, financed by
shoe-string operations, and as suggested by Senator Walcott "of
course it was inevitable that this great structure of innumerable
'7
affiliates should collapse."
Senator Bulkley, another member of the Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency who addressed Congress on the legislation,
posed the following question: "When the national banks, through
their affiliates, followed into the investment-banking business ...
the idea of increased profits more and more obsessed our bankers
. . . . Did not professional pride become diverted from the pride
of safe and honest banking service to that of profits, greed, expansion, power and domination?"
Much of the problem, it was believed, stemmed from the fact that permissive state bank regulation
put pressure on the federal regulators to allow national banks to
step beyond the boundaries of sound banking. In the words of Senator Walcott, the net result was "the disregard of a great many
of the fundamentals of the banking business, taking chances with
depositors' money, and the incorporation and rapid growth of the
affiliate business, giving an outlet to that speculative type of business quite contrary to legitimate commercial banking."
The banks, having set up sales departments to engage in the distribution of securities, now needed to cultivate sales markets in
which to sell the securities and required securities to sell. Banks
also made loans to facilitate stock purchases.' 0 It became necessary
bank portfolios of this country with these investment securities.
They actually dealt in the stocks of the parent bank; and one of
them notably offended by running the stock of a parent bank above
500, and a few days ago it was down to 42. They were organized
to evade the law. That is the very purpose of their existenceto evade the national bank act and to do a business outlawed by
the national bank act-and yet they are so interlocked that it is
difficult to tell which is which.
75 CONG. REC. 9887 (1932).
7. Id. at 9905.
8. Id. at 9911.
9. Id. at 9906.
10. This practice, which fed the securities speculation, was condemned
by Senator Walcott:
It is evident from what has been said that the underlying factor
in the whole prepanic situation was excessive use of bank credit
.... The excessive use of bank credit in making loans for the
purpose of stock speculation, or, more generally stated, for the excessive carrying of securities with borrowed money, was generally
admitted before the panic of 1929, and almost universally since that
time, to have been one of the sources of major difficulty, far exceeding in its scope any total that could be reasonably asked for
as a basis for the financing of legitimate investment business,
Id.
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to seek out issuers even though in some instances, it was thought,
corporations had little or no need for long-term capital." It was
easy, Senator Bulkley stated, to see why on the one hand the security business was over-developed and why it overloaded the country
with unfortunate investments. 12 On the other hand, he said, if "the
business of originating and underwriting investment securities is
confined to houses not engaged in deposit banking, then the extent
and the desirability of new issues will be subjected to an independent and impartial check." 13 Moreover, the business of investment
banking necessarily involved taking risks. If a securities affiliate
suffered a loss, rumors might spread that the bank's financial condition would be impaired because of its loans to the affiliates. Rumors
of stock price manipulation and other abuses of the distribution system, and the possibility of litigation against the banks, also posed
a threat to depositors' confidence. 1 4 Senator Bulkley's conclusion
was unequivocal: "If we want banking service to be strictly banking service, without the expectation of additional profits in selling
something to customers, we must keep the banks out of the investment security business."' 5
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (the 1956 Act), among
other things, was intended to separate banking from other areas
11. Can any banker, imbued with the consciousness that his bondsales department is, because of lack of securities for sale, losing
money and at the same time losing its morale, be a fair and impartial judge as to the necessity and soundness for a new security issue
which he knows he can readily distribute through channels which
have been expensive to develop but which presently stand ready
to absorb the proposed security issue and yield a handsome profit
on the transaction?
Id. at 9911 (remarks of Senator Bulkley).
12. Id.

13. Id. at 9912.
14. Senator Bulkley considered the special role of the banker:
The banker ought to be regarded as the financial confidant and
mentor of his depositors ....

Obviously, the banker who has

nothing to sell to his depositors is much better qualified to advise
disinterestedly and to regard diligently the safety of depositors
than the banker who uses the list of depositors in his savings department to distribute circulars concerning the advantages of this,
that, or the other investment on which the bank is to receive an
originating profit or any underwriting profit or a distribution profit
or a trading profit or any combination of such profits.
Id.
15. Id.

of commerce. As stated in the Report of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency (Senate Committee), "bank holding companies ought not to manage or control nonbanking assets having
no close relationship to banking."' 6 As the following illustrates,
such a separation was felt necessary to prevent banks from employing in nonbanking enterprises funds entrusted in them by depositors and to guard against banks taking unfair advantage in competing with nonbanking enterprises.
Concern over the safety of depositors' funds was expressed in several different ways. The then Chairman of the Board of Governors
of the Federal Reserve System, William McChesney Martin, Jr., expressed concern over the use of depositors' funds in nonbanking
businesses:
Moreover, the ordinary nonbanking business requires a managerial
attitude and involves business risks of a kind entirely different
from those involved in the banking business. Banks operate largely on their depositors' funds. These funds should be used by banks
to finance business enterprises within the limitations imposed by
the banking laws and should not be used directly or indirectly for
the purpose of engaging in other businesses which
are not subject
7
to the safeguards imposed by the banking laws.'
Chairman Martin also stated that the combination of banking and
nonbanking enterprises "involves the lending of depositors' money,
whereas other types of business enterprise, not connected with
banking, do not involve this element of trusteeship." 18 The report
of the House Banking and Currency Committee put it somewhat
differently: "[B]anks are prohibited from engaging in any other
type of enterprise than banking itself

. .

. [b] ecause of the danger

to the depositors which might result where
the bank finds itself
19
in effect both the borrower and the lender."'
Aside from concern that biased and imprudent extensions of
credit to nonbanking affiliates of a bank may seriously jeopardize
the funds of its depositors, the report of the Senate Committee also
warned that such "a bank holding company might misuse or abuse
the resources of a bank it controls in order to gain an advantage
20
in the operation of the nonbanking activities it controls.1
16. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955).
17. Hearings on S. 2577 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1955).
18. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955).

19. H.R. REP. No. 609

ON

H.R. 6227, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in

101 CONG. REc. 8038, 8042 (1955).

20. S. REP. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1955).
The report of the House Committee provides further illustration of this
concern:
If banks were permitted to own nonbanking businesses they would
be compelled in many instances to extend credit to such businesses
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The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970
The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments of 1970 (the
Amendments) reflect not only the same congressional concerns that
are revealed in the 1956 Act-that is, the safety of depositors' funds
and unfair competition-but also concern over the concentration of
economic power in bank holding companies. The primary purpose
of the Amendments was to close the 1956 Act's one-bank holding

company loophole in order to preserve the basic separation of bank
and bank-related activities from other business activities. 2 1 The
testimony at hearings, the floor debates, and the congressional reports consistently cite the problems of bank insolvency, unfair com22
petition, and undue concentration in support of such a separation.
to the detriment of other competitive businesses in the community
and possibly also to a degree which would be unsound from a

banking viewpoint. A bank should always be at arms' length with

its borrowers and such a position could not be maintained were
banks permitted to own nonbanking businesses and make credit
available to them.

Whenever a holding company thus controls both banks and nonbanking businesses, it is apparent that the holding company's nonbanking businesses may thereby occupy a preferred position over
that of their competitors in obtaining bank credit. It is also apparent that in critical times the holding company which operates nonbanking businesses may be subjected to strong temptation to cause
the banks which it controls to make loans to its nonbanking affiliates even though such loans may not at that time be entirely justified in the light of current banking standards. In either situation
the public interest becomes directly involved.
H.R. REP. No. 609 ox H.R. 6227, 84th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 101 CONG.
Rac. 8039, 8042 (1955).
21. H.R. REP. No. 1747, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1970); see 115 CONG.
REC. 32890 (1969) (remarks of Mr. Smith, member of the House Rules Commitee, in support of a resolution regarding House debate of one bank holding company legislation).
22. Chairman Martin discussed the potential threats to bank solvency in
his testimony before the House Committee considering one bank holding
company legislation:
Considerations of safety and soundness reinforce the policy of
separating banking and other businesses. A bank should be insulated from pressures that might lead it to favor customers of affiliated businesses in its credit decisions. Otherwise, the bank might
build an unbalanced loan portfolio by discounting an excessive
amount of obligations of such customers, or a low-quality portfolio
by accepting substandard risks to foster sales to such customers.
An essential part of the traditions of bank management has been
a scrupulous observance of the need for prudence in'handling funds
entrusted to the bank by its customers; if management were to be-

The debates also raised the specter of unfair competition. Representative Patman, Chairman of the House Banking Committee,
stated as one of the factors requiring closing of the one bank holding company loophole that threat of "[1] oan discrimination of banks
in favor of enterprises owned by the holding company and against
companies which compete with subsidiaries of the holding com' 23
pany.
In his testimony at the Senate hearings, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Chairman Frank Wille cited both unfair competition and concentration of economic resources as reasons for one
bank holding company legislation. 24 The possibility of economic
concentration received wide attention in the deliberations leading
come oriented toward the different objectives of other businesses,
this tradition could be seriously weakened.
Hearings on H.R. 6778 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 197 (1969).
This concern was also mentioned by several participants in the House's
floor debates.
Depositors' funds in a bank doing business with a subsidiary business can be threatened because of the extension of unwise credit
to the nonbanking subsidiary. Some of our largest banks in the
1920's were guilty of this type of activity, which caused detriment
to depositors, stockholders, and the public at large.
115 CONG. REc. 32891 (1969) (remarks of Rep. Bennett, member of the House
Rules Committee). See also id. at 32903 (remarks of Rep. Moorhead, member of the House Banking Committee).
23. Id. at 32893 (remarks of Rep. Patman). See also id.at 32891 (remarks of Rep. Bennett); id. at 32903 (remarks of Rep. Moorhead).
Richard W. McLaren, then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the
Antitrust Division, testified before the Senate Committee considering one
bank holding company legislation on this subject:
The economic power enjoyed by banks is substantially enhanced
by the fact that commercial banking markets are local markets for
most customers. Competitive alternatives in local markets are few,
and entry of new competitors is frequently restricted by legislative
provisions or regulatory action. For substantial classes of financial
customers in such markets, unable to journey conveniently and economically to distant metropolitan areas, local banks can be the sole
suppliers of -theservices needed.
One Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970, Hearings Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 239-40 (1970). See
also Mr. McLaren's remarks before the House Committee in The Bank Holding Company Act Amendments, Hearings Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 91-92; textual note 94 supra.
24. The [FDIC] believes that the activities of one-bank holding companies should be brought promptly under effective regulatory control at the Federal level in order to prevent an unhealthy concentration of the nation's economic resources and to control possible
anticompetitive practices in the allocation of credit and financial
services within the nation's economy.
One Bank Holding Company Legislation of 1970, HearingsBefore the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 172 (1970).
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up to the enactment of the Amendments. 25 Aside from general discussion on the floor of the House of the dangers of concentration
at which the Amendments were aimed, 26 much concern was expressed over the potential threat to the economy of the rumored
merger of four of the largest banks in New York and four of the
27
nation's largest insurance companies.
25. In a statement accompanying the administration's version of a bill
to regulate one bank holding companies, the President said:
Left unchecked, the trend toward the combining of banking and
business could lead to the formation of a relatively small number
of power centers dominating the American economy. This must
not be permitted to happen; it would be bad for banking, bad for
business, and bad for borrowers and consumers.
The strength of our economic system is rooted in diversity and
free competition; the strength of our banking system depends
largely on its independence. Banking must not dominate commerce or be dominated by it.
H.R. REP. No. 1747, to accompany H.R. 6778 (Conference Report), 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12 (1970).
The Conference report accompanying the bill which was enacted into the
1970 Amendments also discussed the dangers of undue concentration:
The danger of undue concentration of economic resources and
power is one of the factors which led to the enactment of this legislation, and constitutes a significant threat to the continued healthy
evolution of our free economy. American trade has always operated on the principle that relationships between businessmen, large
and small, should be founded on economic merit rather than monopoly power. Our national policies of limited governmental regulation and interference in trade and commerce, however, do make
it possible for undue concentrations of resources and economic
power to override fundamental fairness and economic merit when
responding to the profit motive. This possibility is enhanced when
concentrations of power are centered about money, credit and other
financial areas, the common denominators of the economy. The
dangers may be more pronounced where resources are more easily
capable of being marshalled, or where the course of business is
likely to lead to the constant realization of the existence of power
by buyers and sellers in the marketplace.
Id. at 17.
26. 115 CONG. REC. pt. 24, at 32894, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Nov. 4, 1969) (remarks of Rep. Patman). See also id. at 32891 (remarks of Rep. Bennett);
id. at 32903 (remarks of Rep. Moorhead).
27. This concern included this statement by Chairman Patman during the
House debate:
In addition, serious questions were raised by several witnesses
during our hearings on H.R. 6778, including leading economists,
concerning the tremendous economic power that would be created
by the concentration of giant insurance companies and large banks
under a single holding company umbrella. The ussets of commercial banks and insurance companies comprise most of the assets
available for use by all the institutional investors in the United
States. Insurance companies and banks combined control roughly
$865 billion, or 77.2 percent of the $1.1 trillion of institutional in-

CONCLUSION

To summarize, one of the primary goals of banking legislation
since 1933 has been the separation of banking from other areas of
commerce. The Glass-Steagall Act was enacted in reaction to the
abuses of banks and their securities affiliates in participating in the
speculative fervor of the 1920's which led to the stock market crash
in 1929. The Act effectively ended bank participation in the securities industry for many years.
By 1956, the phenomenon of bank holding companies engaged in
businesses other than banking was in part responsible for the enactment of the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956. Behind its provisions separating commerce and banking were concerns that a combination of the two would unnecessarily jeopardize the funds of
depositors and lead to unfair competition with nonbanking enterprises.
In addition to dealing with the two concerns discussed above, the
1970 Amendments were passed to prevent the undue concentration
of resources which was feared might result from the discovery by
the nation's largest banks of the one-bank holding company loophole in the 1960's.
vestors in the American economy. Commercial banks alone control
$646 billion, or 57.7 percent of this totaL Various news media have
indicated possible mergers, through the holding company device,
of several of the largest commercial banks and largest insurance
companies in the country. One such merger was dropped last

winter after the Justice Department brought suit. However, we
cannot rely in the long run on such administrative action. We
should legislatively prohibit such massive concentrations of economic power. There is no justification for them. By permitting
a combination of banks and insurance companies, a tremendous
concentration of financial resources would be attained to the detriment of the public interest.
Id. at 32897.
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APPENDIX

HlA

[Letterhead of the Administrator of National Banks]
November 11, 1974
[Addressee deleted]
Dear
This is in response to your letter of August 14, 1974, and to earlier correspondence dated March 18, 1974 from [name deleted] of [name deleted]
to which we replied on April 19.
[Name deleted], a subsidiary of [name deleted], Inc., requests permission to form an operating subsidiary pursuant to Interpretive Ruling
7.7376. The activities of the proposed subsidiary are described as follows:
1-The subsidiary will manage the business affairs of First
[name deleted], a small business investment company licensed by
the Small Business Administration and wholly owned by the bank.
Personnel now employed by [name deleted] will be transferred to
the proposed subsidiary, but [name deleted] will continue to have
its own board of directors.
2-The subsidiary will provide financial counselling services,
including advice and counselling regarding appropriate forms of
financing, and will collect fees for such services, except that no fee
will be collected from a customer for counselling related to that
part of a financing provided by any direct or indirect subsidiary
of the holding company.
3-The subsidiary will provide financial analysis and advice to
customers in connection with acquisitions, mergers and reorganizations.
4-The subsidiary will not perform legal, accounting, insurance
or real estate brokerage services.
Financial counselling has long been an integral part of the business of
banking. Not only do individual customers frequently seek bank advice
regarding their financial affairs, but business enterprises also need counsel
on a wide range of matters relating to the capitalization and financial
structure of their operations. Since loan officers, who have traditionally
been the source of financial counselling to individuals, may not possess the
necessary sophistication to advise corporations on their financial requirements, it is logical that a bank would want to assemble a group of specialists in corporate finance to fill this need. Indeed, many large banks have
organized corporate finance departments.
Financial counselling may take a variety of forms. For the moment,
[name deleted] intends to provide customers with financial counselling
services on a long-term basis pursuant to contracts calling for a specified
number of hours of counselling per month at a fixed rate. Customers not
under financial counselling contracts will be able to purchase similar
advice for specific projects. In both cases, the advice rendered will cover
the whole range of financial problems that businesses must deal with from
time to time.
The subsidiary's services will also include advising customers regarding
appropriate types of financing. These services will include an in-depth
review of the customer's current financial condition and future needs,
following which the subsidiary will prepare a detailed plan of financing
suitable for the customer (which may consist of debt securities, equity
securities or a combination thereof) based upon conditions in the financial
market and the types of lenders most likely to be interested in providing the
suggested financing (e.g., insurance companies, pension plans, SBIC's,
trust funds, etc.).

With respect to the preparation of detailed plans of financing for business customers, the bank should understand that its activities in this area
could bring the subsidiary close to the borderline between the permissible
activity of financial counselling and the business of investment banking.
This could occur if the subsidiary undertook to locate a purchaser of a
client's securities, or assisted materially in the negotiations between the
client and the purchaser, or charged its client a fee contingent upon successful placement of the securities by the bank. Under section 21 of the
Glass-Steagall Act, 12 U.S.C. 378, banks may not, with certain exceptions,
engage in the business of issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing
securities. The possibility of a violation of this statute by the bank's new
subsidiary is increased by the fact that at least one officer of the subsidiary was formerly employed by a venture capital firm in New York
City. We must caution therefore that the operations of the subsidiary be
confined strictly to those set forth above, namely, the rendering of financial
advice only. Thus, the bank will not be permitted to participate in any
significant way in negotiations between its client and prospective purchasers of equity or debt issues, and may not charge a fee contingent upon
the successful placement of securities. The extent to which the bank contacts prospective purchasers is a matter we will leave to bank counsel, but
as a general matter we do not believe it would be inconsistent with the
Glass-Steagall Act if the bank, after making preliminary inquiries of
potential purchasers, furnished its customer with the names of possible
investors with whom the customer could then undertake negotiations on
its own.
Very truly yours,
Is! J.D. Gwin
John D. Gwin
Deputy Comptroller of the Currency
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APPENDIX IIB

[Letterhead of the Administrator of National Banks]
January 15, 1975
[Addressee deleted]
This is in response to your letter of September 24, 1974, with reference
to a proposal from [name deleted].

The Proposal
The bank proposes to organize a new division, [name deleted] Finance

Company, to provide financial consulting advice to its corporate customers.
This service will initially assist a client in determining his long term
financial objectives. Alternative plans of attaining these objectives will
then be devised and after a selection is made, the bank, through its new
division, will assist in the implementation.
In the event that a client decides to issue debt or equity securities, the
bank will, in the case of a public offering, help the client in choosing and
dealing with an investment banker. In the case of a private placement, the
bank will advise the client of possible sources of capital and assist in preparing a presentation to such sources, including the drafting of an offering
memorandum and providing the necessary financial information.
If the client decides on a merger, the new division will advise and assist
the client in negotiations with the other party.
Agreements between the new division and its client will provide for:
(a) Payment of fees for services rendered, based upon the time spent or
the results accomplished, or both; and
(b) Permit a complete interchange of information betweeen the division
and the bank's loan and credit departments with regard to any
division client who is or may become a borrower of the bank.
Discussion
Financial counselling has long been an integral part of the business of
banking. Not only do individual customers frequently seek bank advice
regarding their personal finances, but business enterprises also need
counsel on a wide range of matters relating to the capitalization and financial structure of their operations. Since loan officers, who have traditionally
been the source of financial counselling to individuals, may not possess the
necessary sophistication to advise corporations on their financial requirements, it is logical that a bank would want to assemble a group of specialists in corporate finance to fill this need. Indeed, many large banks have
organized corporate finance departments.
Because financial counselling is a general concept, further inquiry is
necessary to determine the specific activities that come under this heading.
The purpose of this inquiry is to establish which activities are proper for
commercial bankers and which are reserved to investment bankers under
section 21 of the Glass-Steagall Act. Cf., Investment Company Institute v.
Camp, 401 U.S. 617, 629 (1971).
First, we think that Glass-Steagall cannot be read as prohibiting commercial bankers from performing all the activities that investment bankers
perform. Since both commercial and investment bankers are in the business of furnishing financial advice, there will inevitably be some overlap.
In addition, section 21 of Glass-Steagall bars commercial banks from only
four specific areas: issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing securities.
Activities which fall short of these four areas and which are also incidental
to a commercial bank's function are therefore open to commercial banks.
For example, we feel that assisting a client in determining his long term
financial objectives is not only well within what bankers have done in the

past and are expected to do by their corporate customers, but also far short
of anything Glass-Steagall intended to prohibit. Preparing alternative
routes for achieving these objectives and furnishing advice on the execution of a memorandum describing the alternative selected, are natural
adjuncts to this kind of financial counselling. None of these activities
constitutes issuing, underwriting, selling or distributing securities within
the Glass-Steagall Act.
On the other hand, underwriting an issue of securities is clearly offlimits to commercial banks. This means that a bank may not extend a firm
commitment to purchase an issue with a view to selling the same, nor may
a bank promise only its "best efforts" to market an issue. These activities
rest at the heart of the business known as investment banking and undoubtedly constitute a proscribed underwriting, selling or distribution of
securities.
In the twilight zone lies the degree to which a bank may solicit purchasers
for a client's private placement, the extent to which the bank may participate in the negotiations between buyer and seller, and the fee that the bank
may charge its client.
With regard to the bank's role in seeking investors to purchase a new
issue, we think the bank is free to pass on to its client the names of
prospective purchasers who in the bank's judgment may be interested in
making an investment. This kind of information comes to a bank every
day in the course of its normal business operations. We also would not
object if the bank made preliminary inquiries of several investors to
determine their interest in the new issue.
This does not mean, however, that the bank can participate in the actual
negotiations between its client and the prospective purchaser. Inevitably,
a banker who engages in negotiations of this sort ends us acting as middleman trying to bring buyer and seller together. It is precisely this role that
lies at the heart of the investment banking business. CAnESSO, INVESTMENT
BANKING IN AMERICA, ix, xi, 1, 9, 13 (1970). A banker who participates to
any substantial degree in the direct negotiations between client and purchaser may well be engaged in underwriting, selling or distributing securities in violation of the Glass-Steagall Act.
With respect to fees, we think the bank cannot, consistent with the above
mentioned ban on "best efforts" underwriting, charge a fee contingent upon
the successful placement of a private offering, since the levying of such a
fee is a strong incentive for the bank to locate a purchaser with whom a
deal can be made. Therefore, fees will have to be based on time expended
or some criterion other than the success of the placement.
Raising capital by issuing securities can be accomplished in myriad ways.
See, for example, the various methods listed in United States v. Morgan,
118 F. Supp. 621, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Beyond the guidelines set forth
above, it is impossible for us to define what the role of the bank should be
in each case. The degree to which a bank should become involved in
direct negotiations leading to a merger between its client and another party,
where new stock will be issued, is another question to which this letter is
not addressed. In such situations, bank counsel must guide the bank past
the shoals of the Glass-Steagall Act. In the meantime, we ask that the
bank follow the guidelines set out in this letter when judging the propriety
of its activities. We will be happy to discuss with bank counsel any aspect
of this letter.
Very truly yours,
/s/ J. T. Watson
Justin T. Watson
Deputy Comptroller of the Currency
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APPENDIX III

Bank Term Loan Syndications
This announcementacpears as a matterof record only.

OXIRANE
$232,800,000
Project Financing
Agent and Manager

CHEMICAL BANK
Funds Provided By
CHEMICAL BANK
Bank of America N.T &S.A. ,The Bank of NewYork
The Bank of Nova Scotia •Security Pacific National Bank
Texas Commerce Bank National Association - IrvingTrust Company
Bank of Montreal (California) •European-American Bank and Trust Company
Marine Midland Bank National Bank of Detroit
Republic National Bank of Dallas Toronto Dominion Bank of California
Bank of the Southwest •First City National Bank of Houston •California First Bank
The Bank of TokyoTrust Company - Dresdner Bank AG (Los Angeles Branch)
Wells Fargo Bank N.A. - Houston National Bank

Source: WALL ST.J., Jan. 15, 1976, at 20, cols. 4-6.

Rhi anuncnard
oItaCotd.

$67,000,000
Production Payment Financing for
The Piltsburg &Midway Coal Mining Company
awholly-owned subsidiary of

(Gulf)

Gulf Oil Corporation
From coal production.
Arranged by

CONTINENTAL BANK
Funds provided by

Continental Bank
€I.m,'t
C*mXV

I11
MicPI=Ma
.1cac gs~e

Bank of America NT &SA

Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
of Now York
Philadelphia National Bank
Pittsburgh National Bank
First National Bank of Denver

Source: WALL ST. J., Jan. 7, 1976, at 21, cols. 4-6.
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$350,000,000

Mobil Oil Corporation
5-yearproductionpayment
FINANCING MANAGED BY:
MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK

FUNDS PROVIDED BY:
MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK
FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK

THE CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, N.A.
BANK OF AMERICA NT & SA
CHEMICAL BANK
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST COMPANY
BANKERS TRUST COMPANY
THE BANK OF NEW YORK
THE BANK OF NOVA SCOTIA - NEW YORK AGENCY

CONTINENTAL ILLINOIS NATIONAL BANK AND TRUST COMPANY OF CHICAGO
FIRST CITY NATIONAL BANK OF HOUSTON
FIRST NATIONAL BANK IN DALLAS
THE FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF BOSTON
FIRST PENNSYLVANIA BANK, N.A.

IRVING TRUST COMPANY
MARINE MIDLAND BANK
MELLON BANK, N.A.
NATIONAL BANK OF DETROIT
REPUBLIC NATIONAL BANK OF DALLAS
THE ROYAL BANK OF CANADA
SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK
TEXAS COMMERCE BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION
TORONTO DOMINION BANK - NEW YORK AGENCY
UNITED CALIFORNIA BANK
UNITED STATES TRUST COMPANY OF NEW YORK

Source: WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 1976, at 27, cols. 1-3.

This announcement appears as a matter of record only.

The Kingdom of Thailand
U.S. $100,000,000
Five Year Term Loan
Providedby

Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company
Bank of America National Trust & Savings Association Bank of Montreal singapore Brach
Crocker National Bank Union Bank of Switzerland Londo,,
Branrh
The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation
Standard Chartered Bank Limited
Bangkok Bank Limited
Thai Farmers Bank Limited London
Brdoch
Bankers Trust Company The Bank of Tokyo Trust Company
Chase Asia Ltd. Chemical Bank Citibank, N.A.
Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft Compagnie Financi~re de la Deutsche Bank AG
Dresdner (South East Asia) Limited-Dredner Bank croup The Mitsui Bank of California
Banque Frangaise du Commerce Ext~rieur
Arranged by

Manufacturers Hanover Limited
March, 1976

Source: WALL ST. J., Mar. 26, 1976, at 18, cols. 4-6.
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.fcordonl.

TInattml

Bank Sanaye Iran
US $40,000,000
Five-Year Term Loan
Arrangedby

IranOverseas Investment Bank Limited
(Iranvest)
Managed and Provided by
Marine Midland Bank
Compagnie Fiinacire de la l)cutsche Blank AG
Soci&t5 Ghnrale
Bayerische Vercinshank International SA
The Chase Manhattan Bank,NA.
Coninmrzbank AktienGesellschaft
Irii Overseas ivecstnent Bank Limited
Manufacturers HanovrTist Company
Wells Fargo Bank NA.
BankersTristCoinpany
Crocker National Bank
Manutacturers Hanover Banque Nordilue
lkRahoicrica International Bank NV
Banque Commerciale xor 'Europe do Nord
International Mexican Bank Limited
(Eurobank)
-Inteniex-

AgentBank

IranOverseas Investment Bank Limited

(Iranvest)
Source: WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1976, at 18, cols. 1-2.

APPENDIX IV

Excerpt from Loan Agreement Between Downe Communication,
Inc. and Bank of New York and First National City Bank
13. Negative Covenants. So long as the Company may borrow hereunder
and until payment in full of the Notes and the Term Loan Notes and performance of all other obligations of the Company hereunder, without the
written consent of the Banks, the Company will not:
(a) Borrowing. Create, incur, assume or suffer to exist any liability for
borrowed money, or permit any Subsidiary so to do, except (i) indebtedness
to the Banks, (ii)indebtedness of the Company or any Subsidiary secured
by mortgages, encumbrances or liens permitted by subparagraph 13(b)
hereof, (iii) indebtedness for borrowed money existing on December 31,
1971 as set forth on Schedule 9 hereto, and (iv) letters of credit and discounted notes as set forth on Schedule 10 hereto.
(b) Mortgages and Pledges. Create, incur, assume or suffer to exist any
mortgage, pledge, lien or other encumbrance of any kind (including a
charge upon property purchased under conditional sales or other title
retention agreements) upon, or any security interest in, any of its property
or assets, whether now owned or hereafter acquired, or permit any Subsidiary so to do, except (i) liens for taxes not delinquent or being contested
in good faith and by appropriate proceedings, (i) liens in connection with
workmen's compensation, unemployment insurance or other social security
obligations, (iii) deposits or pledges to secure bids, tenders, contracts
(other than contracts for the payment of money), leases, statutory obligations, surety and appeal bonds and other obligations of like nature arising
in the ordinary course of business, (iv) mechanics', workmen's, materialmen's or other like liens arising in the ordinary course of business with
respect to obligations which are not due or which are being contested in
good faith, (v) the pledge being made pursuant to the Pledge Agreement,
and (vi) those mortgages, pledges, liens and encumbrances set forth on
Schedule 7 hereto or any refinancings (up to the same amount) thereof.
(c) Merger, Acquisition or Sale of Assets. Enter into any merger or consolidation or acquire all or substantially all the assets of any person, firm,
joint venture or corporation, or sell, lease, or otherwise dispose of any of its
assets except in the ordinary course of its business, or permit any Subsidiary so to do.
(d) Loans and Investments. Make loans or advances to or investments
in any person, firm, joint venture or corporation, or permit any Subsidiary
so to do, except () loans existing on December 31, 1971 as set forth on
Schedule 11 hereto, (i) purchases of direct obligations of the United States
of America or any agency thereof, certificates of deposit or acceptances of
banks or trust companies having total assets in excess of $1,000,000,000, or
commercial paper rated prime by a nationally recognized rating service
provided that none of the foregoing shall have maturities in excess of one
year at the date of the purchase thereof; (iii) loans or advances to or
investments in a presently existing Subsidiary and, to the extent consented to by the Banks, any new Subsidiary; and (iv) investments represented by the securities of other companies being pledged in accordance
with the Pledge Agreement.
(e) Contingent Liabilities. Assume, guarantee, endorse, contingently
agree to purchase or otherwise become liable upon the obligation of any
person, firm, joint venture or corporation, or permit any Subsidiary so to do,
except (i) by the endorsement of negotiable instruments for deposit or
collection or similar transactions in the ordinary course of business and (ii)
those contingent liabilities set forth on Schedule 12 hereto.
(f) Capital Expenditures. Make any capital expenditures, or permit any
Subsidiary so to do, in any one fiscal year exceeding in the aggregate for
the Company and the Subsidiaries $600,000.
(g) Dividends and Purchaseof Stock. Declare any dividends (other than
dividends payable in capital stock of the Company) on any shares of any
class of its capital stock, or apply any of its property or assets to the pur-
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chase, redemption or other retirement of, or set apart any sum for the
payment of any dividends on, or for the purchase, redemption or other
retirement of, or make any other distribution by reduction of capital or
otherwise in respect of, any shares of any class of capital stock of the
Company, or permit any Subsidiary (all of whose outstanding shares are not
owned by the Company or another Subsidiary) so to do, or permit any
Subsidiary to purchase or acquire, any shares of any class of capital stock
of the Company.
(h) Sale and Leaseback. Directly or indirectly enter into any arrangement whereby the Company or any Subsidiary shall sell or transfer all or
any substantial part of its fixed assets then owned by it and shall thereupon
or within one year thereafter rent or lease the assets so sold or transferred.
(i) Obligations as Lessee. Enter into any agreements as lessee of any
tangible or intangible property, whether real property, machinery, equipment, personal property or fixtures or permit any Subsidiary so to do, if
the aggregate of all rental payments by the Company and the Subsidiaries
shall exceed an annual rate of $2,100,000.
(j) Stock of Subsidiaries. Sell or otherwise dispose of any shares of
capital stock of any Subsidiary (except in connection with a merger or
consolidation, to the extent permitted under this Agreement, of any Subsidiary into the Company or into another Subsidiary or the dissolution of any
Subsidiary) or permit any Subsidiary to issue any additional shares of its
capital stock except pro rata to its stockholders.
(k) Dissolution, etc. Dissolve or liquidate or permit any Subsidiary so to
do.
(1) New Business. Engage in any business, or permit any Subsidiary to
engage in any business, not of the same general types now conducted by it.
The sale of additional products by mail order, including the sale of additional types of insurance, shall not, for the purposes of this Agreement, be
deemed a new business.
(m) Advertising. Accept or permit any Subsidiary to accept securities
of others in payment for advertising.
(n) Liabilities of Subsidiaries. Permit any Subsidiary to have any
liabilities except (i) liabilities in the ordinary course of business to the
Company or any other Subsidiary, (ii) liabilities for the payment of borrowed money to the Company, (iii) current liabilities to others incurred
or accrued in the ordinary course of business and (iv) liabilities otherwise
permitted under this Agreement.
Form 8-K filed by Downe Communications, Inc. with the SEC,
Source:
May 12, 1972.

APPENDIX V

Foreign Banks with Securities Affiliate in United States
as of December 31, 1974
DOMESTIC BANKING
FOREIGN BANK

SECURITIES AFFILIATE

OPERATIONS (IF ANY)

Algemene Bank
Nederland NV

25% interest in A3D

New York rep. &
branch; Chicago
branch; San Francisco

Amsterdam-Rotterdam Bank NV

Interest in SoGen-

Banca Commerciale

Italiana
Banco Ambrosiano

Securities Corp.

Swiss International.

Minority interest in
Model, Roland & Co.
75% of Ultrafin
International Corp.
33% of Europartners
Securities Corp.

Rep.
One of six shareholders in EuropeanAmerican Bank &
Trust (N.Y.), European-American Corp.
(Cal.) one of 7 in
European Banking
Co. Ltd., branch in
Chig., agency in L.A.
One of seven in European Banking Co.,
Ltd., branch in Chig.
(None)

Banque de

25% of ABD
Securities Corp.
50% of Suez

Banco di Roma
(Chicago); San
Francisco Agency,
New York Agency
Rep.
Branches in N.Y.,
Miami Rep.
Rep. in Chicago,
majority of Bank of
Tokyo of California,
4.95% of Chicago
Tokyo Bank.
Majority of Bank of
Tokyo Trust Co.
(N.Y.) agency in
N.Y.; Portland
branch, Seattle
branch, Houston Rep.
Representatives in
New York.
Branch in New York.

Banque Lambert

Interest in New Court

(None)

Banque Rothschild

Interest in New Court
Securities Corp.

(None)

Bank Julius Baer
& Co., Ltd.

Baer Securities Corp.

Baer American

Bayerische Hypoth-

25% of ABD
Securities Corp.

Banca Di Roma

Bank Leumi
Le-Israel B.M.
Bank of Tokyo, Ltd.

Banque de Bruxelles

L'Indochine

eken-undWechsel-Bank

Leumi Securities

Corp. (Israel Secs.)
5% of Nomura
Securities Int., Inc.

American Corp.

Securities Corp.

Credit Corp., Ltd.
(international finance
corp.) (N.Y.)
(None)
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FOREIGN BANK

SECURITIES AFFILIATE

DOMESTIC BANKING
OPERATIONS (IF ANY)

Commerzbank AG

33% of Europartners
Securities Corp.

Branch in Chicago
and New York

Compagnie
Financiere de Paris
et des Pays-Bas

20% interest in
Becker and WarburParibas Group, Inc.,
holding co. for:
(a) Warburg Paribas
Becker, Inc.;
(b) A.G. Becker &
Co., Inc.; (c) Becker
Securities Corp.

(None)

Compagnie
Financiere de Suez

50% of Suez
American Corp.

New York representative

Credit Lyonnais

33% of Europartners
Securities Corp.

New York Branch
and representative

Daiwa Bank Ltd.

6.9% of New Japan
Securities Int., Inc.;
2.2% of Nomura
Securities International Inc.

New York and Los
Angeles agencies

Deutsche Bank AG

50% of UBS-DB
Corp.

One of six in European-American Bank
& Trust and one of
seven in EuropeanAmerican Bank Co.,
Ltd.

25% of ABD
Securities Corp.

Chicago and New
York branch; L.A.
agency.

Robert Fleming
& Co., Ltd.

Robert Fleming, Inc.

(None)

Fuji Bank Ltd.

2.3% of Nikko
Securities International Inc.; 8.5% of
Yamaichi International

Hill Samuel &
Co., Ltd.

Hill Samuel Securities
Corp.

L.A. and New York
agency; Chicago
Representative, Fuji
Bank and Trust
Company (N.Y.).
(None)

Industrial Bank
of Japan

3.4% of Daiwa
Securities Co., Ltd.;
9.4% of New Japan
Securities International Inc.; 2.3% of
Nikko Securities International, Inc.; 2.1%
of Nomura Securities
International, Inc.;
8.5% of Yamaichi
International Inc.

Dresdner Bank AG

New York and Los
Angeles agency;
Industrial Bank of
Japan Trust Co.
(N.Y.).

Kleinwort Benson Ltd.

Kleinwort Benson,
Inc.

(None)

Kredietbank NV

Partial interest in
Ultrafin International, Inc.

New York representative.

3.4% of Daiwa
Securities Inc.

New York branch.

2.5% of Nikko
Securities International, Inc.; 8.5% of
Yamaichi International, Inc.

Los Angeles agency;
Chicago representative; Mitsubishi Bank
of California

Long-Term Credit
Bank of Japan Ltd.
Mitsubishi Bank Ltd.

